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ARTICLES
IMAGERY AND ADJUDICATION IN THE CRIMINAL
LAW: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMAGES OF
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AND IDEOLOGIES OF
CRIMINAL LAW IN SOUTHERN ANTEBELLUM AND
MODERN APPELLATE DECISIONS"
Bernard E. Harcourtt
INTRODUCTION
Criminal law opinions often project a distinct image of the
accused. Sometimes, she is cast in a sympathetic light and may
appear vulnerable or impressionable: a single mother, whose
husband has died, struggling to raise her two, loving children;1
an impoverished, nineteen-year-old African-American with a
fifth-grade education, "mentally dull and 'slow to learn;" 2 or a
defenseless "obedient servant," protecting himself from an
"adversary armed with a deadly weapon."' On other occasions,
the defendant may appear threatening, savage or even diaboli-
cal: a cold-blooded recidivist that escapes from a prison work-
crew, brutally stabs, rapes and murders a woman, and returns
for a hot lunch with his fellow inmates;4 a six-foot-tall "black
* @1995 Bernard E. Harcourt. All Rights Reserved.
t Senior Fellow, Graduate Program, Harvard Law School. J.D. 1989, Harvard
Law School, A.B. 1984, Princeton University. I am grateful for the financial
support provided by the Mark DeWolfe Howe Fund at Harvard Law School and
especially grateful to Jorge Esquirol, Terry Fisher, A. Leon Higginbotham, Juliette
Kayyem, David Kennedy, Mmia Ruyter, Dan Simon and Carol Stelher for their
invaluable comments.
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 562 n.4 (1958).
s The State v. Abram, a slave, 10 Ala. 928, 929, 932 (1847).
Mu'Ain v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
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male" rapist wearing a black jacket with "Big Ben" printed on
the back;5 a "brute creation" or a ran-away, "lurking in
swamps, woods, and other obscure places, killing hogs, and
committing other injuries to... inhabitants."
During certain historical periods, the images are remark-
ably consistent and identifiable. Southern antebellum opinions,
for instance, consistently project an image of the slave criminal
defendant as a chameleon-shifting from the harmless and
obedient servant to the threatening and rebellious slave, and
vice versa. The opinions of the Warren Court reflect a consis-
tent image of the defendant as a vulnerable young person,
poor, and uneducated, at the mercy of overbearing police offi-
cers. The Rehnquist Court, in contrast, consistently projects an
image of the criminal defendant as deeply threatening, cold-
blooded and recidivist.
During these historical periods, the texts also reveal re-
markably consistent, distinct and identifiable ideologies of
criminal law. The southern antebellum slave cases, for in-
stance, reflect a consistent effort to place discretion in the
hands of slaveholders. In Alabama, slaves accused of capital
crimes were tried by juries that were composed of at least two
thirds slaveholders; and the slaveholder was a competent wit-
ness at his slave's trial.' The Warren Court made its mission
in criminal law to even the scales of justice in favor of the
uneducated, impoverished and unknowing defendant. The
landmark decisions of the Warren Court provided counsel to
the poor, like Clarence Earl Gideon;8 warnings to the unknow-
ing, like Ernesto Miranda;9 safeguards for the fourteen-year-
old, like Robert Gallegos; 0 and protections for African-Amer-
icans, like Robert Swain." In sharp contrast, the Rehnquist
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984).
'Abram, 10 Ala. at 932; ACT OF 1805 § 13, in C.C. CLAY, A DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA CONTAINING ALL THE STATUTES OF A PUBLIC AND
GENERAL NATURE, IN FORCE AT TE CLOSE OF THE SESSION OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY IN FEBRUARY, 1843 (1843), Slaves, and Free Persons of Color § 541
(hereinafter "CLAY'S DIGEST").
Spence, a slave v. State, 17 Ala. 192 (1850); see also ALA. CODE § 3317
(1852).
' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
,0 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
" Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Although the Swain decision today
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Court has made its mission to even the scales of justice in
favor of the victim, the police officer and the state. The land-
mark decisions of the Rehnquist Court allow victim-impact
evidence at the penalty phase of capital trials, 2 testimony of
victimized children by closed-circuit television,m public-safety
exceptions to Miranda,14 and state-rights limitations on the
writ of habeas corpus.'5
Traditionally, the relationship between imagery and ideol-
ogy has been interpreted through the lens of causality. The
ideology of criminal law, it is said, expresses itself in the con-
struction of fact patterns, time-framing and images that con-
trol the outcome of the litigation. From this perspective, imag-
es are the product of ideology, in part16 or in whole, 7 and
are the means of ideological persuasion. This view is illustrat-
ed well in some discussions of racial imagery in the antebellum
and Reconstruction periods:
In some periods, society needed to suppress a group, as with blacks
during Reconstruction. Society coined an image to suit that pur-
pose-that of primitive, powerful larger than life blacks, terrifying
and barely under control. At other times, for example during slav-
ery, society needed reassurance that blacks were docile, cheerful,
and content with their lot. Images of sullen, rebellious blacks dissat-
isfied with their condition would have made white society uneasy.
Accordingly, images of simple, happy blacks, content to do the
master's work, were disseminated."8
is generally viewed as restrictive, at the time of its release it was perceived as
safeguarding the rights of minorities.
" Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
*' New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
See, e.g., M cCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (restricting availability of
writ on successive petition); Keeney v. Tamayo.Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (restrict-
ing right to evidentiary hearing on petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal
court); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (restricting availability of writ
where counsel erred in state post-conviction proceedings); Teague v. Lane, 489 Us.
288 (1989) (restricting retroactive applicability of new rules of law).
' See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law,
33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 670 (1981) (one account of interpretive constructions is that
they "correspond to the political program of a social class").
17 See J.. Balldn, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197 (1990); J.
M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1991) (discussing how
ideology constrains structure).
, Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law
and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systematic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1258, 1276 (1992). Delgado and Stefancic do not limit their analysis to the
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In this Article, I suggest a more dynamic relationship be-
tween images and ideologies. My thesis is that images of crimi-
nal defendants and ideologies of criminal law relate in a mutu-
ally transformative manner that exerts centrifugal force in the
adjudicative process. Images and ideologies feed back on each
other: ideologies shape and sharpen images, but images also
sharpen and transform ideologies. The images of the criminal
defendant that are projected into the adjudicative process ac-
quire a force of their own that reinforces, radicalizes and trans-
forms the related ideology of criminal law, and, in this process,
breaks down communication between the parties. As a result
of competing images of the criminal defendant, the parties
gradually begin to speak about entirely different individuals.
This process ultimately creates an unbridgeable distance in
criminal law adjudication.
The purpose of this Article, then, is to explore how the use
of imagery in the criminal law affects the adjudicative pro-
cess. 9 A dynamic understanding of the relationship explains
more fully the power of images. Images of the defendant are
forceful devices in politics and adjudication.2" Hidden from the
traditional, causal relationship between images and ideology. The authors clearly
recognize that there is more to this relationship. They explicitly state that "we are
our current stock of narratives, and they us." Id. at 1280. According to Delgado
and Stefancic, images "begin[ ] to shape and determine us, who we are, what we
see, how we select, reject, interpret and order subsequent reality." Id.
" Other studies of imagery and its role in law and politics include Delgado &
Stefancic, supra note 18; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases,
67 TUL. L. REV. 1739 (1993); Vicky Munro.Bjorklund, Popular Cultural Images of
Criminals and Prisoners Since Attica, 18 SOC. JUST. 48 (1991); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1945 (1993); and the essays con-
tained in Symposium, Changing Images of the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1179
(1994). Works that chronicle images of African-Americans in popular culture in.
clude CATHERINE SILK & JOHN SILK, RACISM AND ANTI-RACISM IN AMERICAN POPU-
LAR CULTURE (1990); SPLIT IMAGE: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE MASS MEDIA (J. L.
Dates & W. Barlow eds.) (1990); and the works listed in "Resources for the Study
of Ethnic Depiction in the United States-African.Americans," appended to Delgado
& Stefancic, supra note 18, at 1292.94.
"' In fact, in our visually-oriented culture, the visual often controls the political
debate. See Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture
in the Politics of Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263, 264 (1987). This is demon-
strated well in the abortion context, where ultrasound images of the fetus, as well
as photographs of the dead fetus, have mobilized many anti-abortionists and em-
powered the pro-life movement. Id. It was also made evident during the 1988
presidential campaign, when the image of Villie Horton galvanized public opinion
and contributed to the demise of presidential hopeful Michael Dukakis. See Paul
1168 [Vol. 61: 1165
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decisionmaking process, the images exert subtle influence on
the reader. Their power derives in large part from the fact that
they are so often veiled,2 hidden not from the text or the
reader, but from the decisionmaking process.
In order to expose the role of imagery in criminal adjudica-
tion, this Article critically examines the criminal law texts
from three periods in American legal history-the southern
antebellum period, the Warren Court, and the Rehnquist
Court. The analysis of the antebellum period focuses on south-
ern court cases involving slave criminal defendants. Because
the states in the Deep South, particularly Alabama, have
earned a reputation among legal historians of having had more
enlightened criminal procedures for slave defendants than
their mid-Atlantic counterparts, this Article pays particular
attention to the decisions from the state of Alabama. The
Finkehnan, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2063, 2063.64 (1993) ("'The image
of Willie Horton was effective in the 1988 presidential campaign because it reflect-
ed a pervasive belief in America that blacks are a dangerous class"); Peter
Margulies, 'Who Are You to Tell Me That?': Attorney.Client Deliberation Regarding
Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213, 220 n.23
(1990) ('The brutal crimes committed by Horton ingrained themselves in the public
imagination, which also seemed to latch on to the fact, brought home by a photo-
graph in one of the ads, that Horton was black. The saliency of the image of
Horton, his crimes, and his white victims eclipsed all reasonable talk about
Dukakis's and other furlough programs around the country."). See generally John-
son, supra note 19.
21 According to Jacques Lacan, the phallus, as the symbol of power, "can play
its role only when veiled." Jacques Lacan, The Signification of the Phallus, ECRITS:
A SELECTION 288 (A. Sheridan trans., 1977).
' Helen Tunnlciff Catterall, the editor of the multi-volume compilation on the
laws of slavery, wrote in 1928 that "[a] liberal spirit pervades the Alabama deci-
sions down to 1859." 3 JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE
NEGRO 126 (Helen Tunncliff Catterall ed., reprint 1968). Catterall especially
praised the slave criminal procedure decisions writing that "[t]he number of cases
in which slaves convicted of crimes were granted new trials is remarkable, all the
resources of the law being invoked in their favor.* Id. at 128. A. E. Keir Nash,
who has written extensively about the criminal process afforded slaves in the
antebellum South, reports an "apparent libertarianism" in the treatment of slaves
accused of crimes by state appellate judges in the Deep South-"an overlooked
antebellum tradition of solicitude for the black defendant." AE. Heir Nash, Fair-
ness and Formalism in the Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme Courts of the
Old South, 56 VA. L. REv. 64, 65-66 (1970). A number of other scholars have simi-
larly praised the appellate courts of the Deep South. See, e.g., Daniel J. Flanigan,
Criminal Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum South, 40 J. S. HIST. 537
(1974); Reuel E. Schiller, Conflicting Obligations: Slave Law and the Late Antebel-
lum North Carolina Supreme Court, 78 VA. L. REV. 1207 (1992); but see Judith
Schafer, The Long Arm of the Law: Slave Criminals and the Supreme Court in
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analysis of the Warren Court focuses on the majority opinions
issued by the Supreme Court during the tenure of Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren that the Chief Justice wrote or in which he
joined. In order to distill the imagery of the Warren Court, the
Article places special attention on majority opinions written by
Warren.' The analysis of the Rehnquist Court focuses on the
opinions written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, opinions
written by members of the Supreme Court during the tenure of
Chief Justice Rehnquist in which Rehnquist joined, as well as
the decisions written by former Justice Rehnquist during the
tenure of Chief Justice Warren Burger.
In Part I, the Article provides a theoretical context for the
inquiry and proposes a working paradigm from the field of
cognitive psychology. Part II describes the imagery of criminal
defendants during the three historical periods. Part III discuss-
es the ideologies of criminal law prevalent during these histori-
cal periods. Part IV explores the relationship between the
images of criminal defendants and the ideologies of criminal
law. Part V discusses some generalizations that can be drawn
from the analysis. In conclusion, the Article explores the impli-
cations for criminal adjudication.
I. A THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND A WORKING PARADIGM
FROM THE FIELD OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
A. The Theoretical Context
The inquiry into the role of imagery in human judgment
traces its source to antiquity.' For purposes of contemporary
Antebellum Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1247 (1986). Terry Fisher recently conclud-
ed that "in Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee, the
courts could claim with some plausibility that, 'whenever life is involved, the slave
stands upon as safe ground as the master.'" William W. Fisher, Ell, Ideology and
Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1051, 1053 (1993) (quoting
Cato v. State, 9 Fla. 163, 173-74 (1860)). Because of its reputation as having more
enlightened appellate courts, this Article pays particular attention to the decisions
from the state of Alabama.
' In majority opinions, "the author is more anxious to attract others to join
his actual opinion (as opposed to just voting the same way)" and those opinions
may reflect more clearly the shared images and ideology of the court. Craig M.
Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the Rehnquist Court: Has the Rehnquisition Be-
gun?, 62 IND. L. J. 273, 274 n.6 (1987).
" In the "pre-scientific" period of mental imagery, there were, broadly
1170 [Vol. 61: 1165
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American jurisprudence, however, the trunk stream was
formed in the early part of the twentieth century during the
realist challenge to classical legal thought. For it is then that
scholars like Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn began to ques-
tion the importance of mental imagery in the judicial
decisionmaking process.'
In contrast to the classical tradition, which emphasized
the role of abstract principles in adjudication, Frank,
Llewellyn and others' emphasized the personal experiences
speaking, three theories about the role of mental images in knowledge. The imag-
ist theory, which traces its genealogy to Aristotle and became dominant in the
British Empiricist tradition exemplified by Berkeley, held "that mental images, and
especially uisual images, are the primary symbols of thinking and that thought
consequently has images as its base." GEIR KAUFMANN, IMAGERY, LANGUAGE AND
COGNITION: TOWARD A THEORY OF SYMBOLIC ACTIVITY IN HUMAN PROBLEM SOLV-
ING 14 (1980). Thus, according to Berkeley, words and concepts *have meaning,
but only indirectly, in relation to images." Id. at 14. The linguistic theory, associ-
ated with Cassirer, asserts in its extreme form that 'verbal thinking is the only
'real' thinking" and that there are no mental images. Id. at 17. A third theory,
conceptualist theory, which traces its origins to Plato, Socrates, Descartes and
Kant, suggests that "thinking is held to be a unique type of cognitive activity
which may accompany and be expressed (or formulated) in language, imagery or
relevant action, and may also occur in the absence of there .... Language and
imagery are, thus, placed in a purely external and adventitious relation to the act
of thinking, and assigned a secondary auxiliary function." Id. at 19.
s See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Jerome Frank,
What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645 (1932); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some
Realism About Realism-Reponding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
Although these scholars will be discussed together, this is not to suggest that they
did not have significant differences of opinion. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE
CRMIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 82-83, 87 (1973).
' Classical legal thought, which is associated with the period roughly from
1860 to 1937, offered a formal style of judicial reasoning. Classical legal theory
claimed that reasoning proceeded syllogistically from rules and precedents
that had been clearly defined historically and logically, through the par-
ticular facts of a case, to a clear decision. The function of the judge was
to discover analytically the proper rules and precedents involved and to
apply them to the case as first premises. Once he had done that, the
judge could decide the case with certainty and uniformity.
PURCELL, JR., supra note 25, at 74-75; see also WILLIAM W. FISHER IMl, El" AL,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM xii (1993).
"7 See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 CoLUM. L. REV. 809, 843 (1935) ("[a] truly realistic theory of judicial decisions
must conceive every decision as something more than an expression of individual
personality, as concomitantly and even more importantly a function of social forces,
that is to say, as a product of social determinants and an index of social conse-
quences."); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 881 (1930)
("Since a choice implies motives, it is obvious that, somewhere, somehow, a judge
is impelled to make his selection-not quite freely, as we have seen, but within
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of the judge. In his work, Law and the Modern Mind, originally
published in 1930, Jerome Frank argued that "biases and prej-
udices and conditions of attention affect the judge's reasoning
as they do the reasoning of ordinary men." According to
Frank, these biases led the judge to form tentative conclusions,
or "hunches," about cases that often were outcome determi-
native."
'"hat, then, are the hunch-producers?"3 Frank asked. In
part, they included the mental images of the judge. Thus,
Frank explained:
[The judge's] own past may have created plus or minus reactions to
women, or blonde women, or men with beards, or Southerners, or
Italians, or Englishmen, or plumbers, or ministers, or college gradu-
ates, or Democrats. A certain twang or cough or gesture may start
up memories painful or pleasant in the main. Those memories of the
judge, while he is listening to a witness with such a twang or cough
or gesture, may affect the judge's initial hearing of, or subsequent
recollection of, what the witness said, or the weight or credibility
which the judge will attach to the witness's testimony. 2
These mental images and memories were, for Frank, the "hid-
generous limits as a rule-by those psychical elements which make him the kind
of person that he is.").
' FRANK, supra note 25, at 145 (Echoing the famous introductory passages of
OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, THE COMION LAw 1 (1881) that "[t]he felt necessities
of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow
men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the
rules by which men should be governed.").
' FRANK, supra note 25, at 113; see also Joseph Hutchinson, The Judgment
Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274,
285 (1929) ("The vital, motivating impulse for the decision, is an intuitive sense of
what is right or wrong for that case"); FISHER ET AL., supra note 26, at 165;
PURCELL JR., supra note 25, at 83.
' FRANK, supra note 25, at 101. The American Legal Realists were not, of
course, the first to observe that personal experiences played a role in
decisionmaking. Generations before them, Puritans in England remarked of courts
of equity that "Tis all one as if they should make the standard for measure a
Chancellor's foot." See Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America:
Controversies over Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century,
reprinted in LAw IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 260 (Donald Fleming & Bernard
Bailyn, eds., Boston: Little, Brown and Company 1971); David Thomas Konig,
Community Custom and the Common Law: Social Change and the Development of
Land Law in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts, 18 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 137, 171
(1974).
" FRANK, supra note 25, at 104.
SFRAN, supra note 25, at 106.
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den factors" that gave depth, individuality, and complexity to
the other, cruder "hunch-producers" like the "political, econom-
ic and moral biases" of the judge.' The exact relationship,
however, between mental imagery and ideology was left some-
what ambiguous. Although the memories often were consistent
with and possibly shaped ideology, Frank also left open the
possibility of unexpected consequences.' In the final analysis,
the exact relationship remained murky.
In the field of criminal law, Mark Kelman picks up where
Jerome Frank left off and addresses the role of mental imagery
in his article entitled Interpretive Construction in the Substan-
tive Criminal Law.36 Kelman's goal, like that of Frank, is to
challenge "the falsely complacent sense that the [standard doc-
trinal arguments routinely made by judges and commentators
on the substantive criminal law], while grounded in politically
controversial purposes, are deduced or derived in a rational
and coherent fashion once the purposes are settled."' Kelman
attempts to demonstrate that decisionmakers use conscious
and unconscious interpretive constructs-such as mental imag-
ery and the time-framing of fact patterns-to reach the result
they want.
Like Frank, however, Kelman ultimately remains noncom-
mittal about the relationship between images and ideology. At
points, he argues that interpretive constructs unconsciously
determine the outcome of appellate decisions. He states that
the constructs operate non-rationally to allow the
decisionmaker to avoid dealing with difficult political prob-
lems.' At other times, however, Kelman offers a second inter-
FRANK supra note 25, at 105.
' FRANK, supra note 25, at 106 ("[a] man's political or economic prejudices are
frequently cut across by his affection for or animosity to some particular individual
or group, due to some unique experience he has had").
' FRANK, supra note 25, at 106 ("a racial antagonism which [the judge] enter-
tains may be deflected in a particular case by a desire to be admired by some one
who is devoid of such antagonism").
Kelman, supra note 16.
Kelman, supra note 16, at 591.
Kelman, supra note 16, at 600; see also Kelman, supra note 16, at 642
("[clonscious interpretive constructs, like the unconscious ones, operate to avoid
fundamental political problems"); Kelman, supra note 16, at 652 ("What is fascinat-
ing is that writers like Williams can so blithely dismiss deterministic accounts in
general, while adopting them wholeheartedly, without explanation, when it suits
some particular program. Once more, the point is not the ultimate result, but the
1173
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pretation-what he calls a "plausible"39 reading of his
work-that suggests a causal relationship between ideology
and image. Under this reading, the interpretive construct man-
ifests class conflict: "each construction might correspond to the
political program of a social class."0 Kelman calls this view
"construction determinism," by which he means "a belief that
the interpretive technique an analyst uses is itself a product of
the social class he politically supports."' In this second sense,
ideology produces images.
J. M. Balkin develops Kelman's second interpretation in
his article entitled The Rhetoric of Responsibility.42 For
Balkin, though, the causal relationship is far clearer than for
Kelman: whereas Kelman saw structure in legal argument
and, according to Balkin, mistakenly interpreted it as non-
rational, Balkin sees structure and concludes that it is dictated
by ideology. Balkin writes, "For me, the central issue in the
study of factual characterizations begun by Kelman is not
rationality but ideology. We reason about legal issues, but we
always do so within an ideological framework that gives coher-
ence and meaning to our debates."' For Balkin, then, the re-
lationship between ideology and image is one of causation:
ideology constrains images. "Ideology ... is reflected by how
people choose characterizations of responsibility in different so-
cial settings." Balkin develops his theory further in his arti-
cle Ideology as Constraint,45 where he writes that his "theory
can be summed up in three words: 'Ideology Is Constraint."'
Balkin argues there that "[riegularities in legal thought and
belief are not due merely to the existence of objective social
rules or legal doctrine, but also to the contributions of shared
ideology.""
Ideology as constraint, however, does not give full expres-
sion to the effect that images can have on ideologies-to the
nonrationality of method in a purportedly rationalistic discourse.").
Kelman, supra note 16, at 670.
" Kelman, supra note 16, at 670.
41 Kelman, supra note 16, at 670 (emphasis added).
J. M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197 (1990).
43 Id. at 199.
Id. at 262.
J. M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (1991).
Id. at 1138.
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fact that images may also constrain. Rosalind Petchesky con-
tributes the crucial next step in the debate with her article
entitled Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Poli-
tics of Reproduction.' In her article, Petchesky attempts to
demonstrate how the pro-life movement has appropriated the
visual terrain in the abortion debate by using images of fetuses
and by visualizing the abortion process. According to
Petchesky, anti-abortionists have learned that the image of "a
dead fetus is worth a thousand words." 8 Petchesky focuses on
ultrasound imaging and, in particular, on the television pro-
duction The Silent Scream which "purports to show a medical
event, a real-time ultrasound imaging of a twelve-week-old
fetus being aborted." 9 According to the medical narrator in
The Silent Scream, this enables the viewer to witness an abor-
tion "from the victim's vantage point."'0 The screen shows
"[t]he suction cannula [as it] is 'moving violently' toward 'the
child'... The fetus 'does sense aggression in its sanctuary,' at-
tempts to 'escape' (indicating more rapid movements on the
screen), and finally 'rears back its head' in 'a silent scream."
The image, combined with the explanation, is powerful.
Petchesky recognizes that the image is the product of an ideol-
ogy: "the fetal image [is] a symbol that condenses a complicat-
ed set of conservative values-about sex, motherhood, teenage
girls, fatherhood, the family."52 Yet, Petchesky also shows how
the image can transform ideology. The use of ultrasound im-
aging has altered radically our general perception of abortion.
According to studies, "early fetal ultrasound tests resulto in
'maternal bonding' and possibly 'fewer abortions." Moreover,
according to Petchesky, the "panoptics of the womb" have de-
graded the pregnant woman: "She now becomes the 'maternal
environment,' the 'site' of the fetus, a passive spectator in her
own pregnancy."' The image has affected the use of technolo-
Petchesky, supra note 20.
'7 Petchesky, supra note 20, at 263.
Petchesky, supra note 20, at 266.
Petchesky, supra note 20, at 266.
', Petchesky, supra note 20, at 266-67.
Petchesky, supra note 20, at 281.
Petchesky, supra note 20, at 265.
Petchesky, supra note 20, at 277. Petchesky recognizes that this may be true
for some pregnant mothers, but not for all, and that decoupling the power rela-
tions from the technologies may entail retaining ultrasound technologies.
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gies, privileging fetus-oriented technologies at the expense of
mother-oriented ones."
It is here that we can see how image and ideology relate in
a dynamic way. The fetus, as an independent being, has
achieved viability through the imaging process. The image of
the fetus has become independent, a being no longer tied to the
mother. It has become more real than the fetus itself. In this
sense, the image is now reality." It cannot be dismissed as a
mere "distortion," or a mere "surface impression." 57 In the
abortion debate, there is now an "it" (fetus or baby) in the
privacy of the womb that somehow has connected to people in
society independently of its relationship with its mother. In
this way, the image interferes in the ideological debate, shifts
its focus, and amplifies the disagreement. Images of dead fe-
tuses are waved in front of images of coat-hangers, creating
centrifugal force in the political debate and propelling the two
movements further and further apart.
Petchesky's article thus reflects the transformative poten-
tial of images and their powerful effect in creating centrifugal
force in the debate. In many ways, Petchesky's focus on images
and ideologies-as well as Kelman's and Balkin's similar inter-
ests-reflects a sensibility heavily influenced by Clifford
Geertz's essays written in the mid-1960s and collected in The
Interpretation of Cultures.' In those essays, Geertz explored
the role of ideologies and the relationship between images, as
symbols, and ideology. In Religion As a Cultural System,5 9 for
' Petchesky, supra note 20, at 271. Petchesky notes "the correlation some
researchers have observed between increased use of electronic fetal monitoring and
ultrasound and the threefold rise in the cesarean section rate in the last fifteen
years." Petchesky, supra note 20, at 274.
" This is the precession of the simulacra. See Jean Baudrillard, The Precession
of Simulacra, in ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETIUNKING REPRESENTATION 253 (Brian
Wallis ed., 1984).
"7 Petchesky, supra note 20, at 264. Petchesky argues that the image is a
distortion "[fletal imagery epitomizes the distortion inherent in all photographic
images: their tendency to slice up reality into tiny bits wrenched out of real space
and time." Petchesky, supra note 20, at 268. Along with Roland Barthes,
Petchesky suggests that the appearance of the photographic image as reality "ob-
scures the fact that that image is heavily constructed, or coded." Petchesky, supra
note 20, at 269.
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973).
Clifford Geertz, Religion As a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 87 (1973).
1176 [Vol. 61: 1165
1995] IMAGERY AD ADJUDICATION IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
instance, Geertz offered a definition of religion as a "system of
symbols" which "acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and
long-lasting moods and motivations in men.' Geertz suggest-
ed an interpretation of religious rituals as symbols that rein-
force the religion itself. Thus, the spectacular theatrical perfor-
mance of the masked dance of Rangda (the witch) and Barong
(the monster) in the religious culture of Bali is described by
Geertz as producing an ethos that reinforces religious belief."
It is, for the believing Balinese, "both the formulation of a
general religious conception and the authoritative experience
which justifies, even compels, its acceptance."' The cultural
concept of symbols is a system of "inherited conceptions" that
allow men and women to communicate, "and develop their
knowledge about and attitudes toward life.' 6 The symbol
transforms, reinforces and shapes religious belief. Similarly, in
his essay Ideology As a Cultural System," Geertz advanced a
conception of ideology as a symbolic structure whose power
draws from the symbols' ability to "formulate, and communi-
cate social realities that elude the tempered language of sci-
ence.' Ideological symbols, though they may appear overly
simplified, are able to give special meaning to social phenome-
na, motivate action and affect people's lives. In this way, the
symbol has a positive feedback on our beliefs-just as, in our
context, the image has a transformative effect on legal ideolo-
gy.
6 6
It is within this context that this Article offers one answer
to the question, what is the relationship between images of
criminal defendants and ideologies of criminal law? In light of
the realist antecedents of the problematic, it is fitting to seek
guidance from recent discoveries in the experimental scienc-
es.
67
" Id. at 90.
61 Id. at 114-18.
6Id. at 118.
"Id. at 89.
"Id. at 193.
Id at 210.
Geertzs use of the word "ideology," however, differs slightly from my use of
the term in this Article. While Geertz used the term to describe the set of ideas
held by society, I am using the term more specifically to refer to the set of ideas
embodied in the criminal law.
' The role of social sciences in the development o& and articulation of the
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B. A Working Paradigm from Cognitive Psychology
Two fields of cognitive psychology provide a helpful way to
conceptualize the dynamic, feed-back relationship between
image and ideology and its centrifugal effect on the adjudica-
tive process. The first field, image theory, is a relatively new,
experimental discipline that takes the problem of mental imag-
ery as its main domain.' Mental imagery is the mental repre-
sentation of nonpresent objects or events. 69 It is, for instance,
the mental image of the criminal defendant that comes to mind
when we put down the morning newspaper containing a photo-
graph of the defendant. The process of mentally visualizing the
image raises a number of questions about how we store images
in memory and how we call up mental images. The discipline
of mental imagery has been the source of its own ideological
debate ° and has generated a number of competing theories
that address how the mind processes images."1 There is now,
tenets of the Legal Realists is well documented. See PURCELL, supra note 25, at
15-28 (describing the rapid growth and institutionalization of the social sciences
during the early twentieth century) and at 85-88 (describing the role of the social
sciences in the Legal Realist movement). Jerome Frank, for instance, exclaimed in
Law and the Modern Mind that "[olur law schools must become, in part, schools
of psychology applied to law in all its phases." FRANK, supra note 25, at 145-46.
" See Allan Paivio, MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS: A DUAL CODING APPROACH 3
(1986). A concise overview of theories of mental representations can be found in
Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and
the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 332-42 (1995).
11 ROBERT L. SOLso, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 242 (2d ed. 1988); see also JOHN
R. ANDERSON, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 91 (3d ed. 1990).
" There is no dispute that we form mental images. This is illustrated well in
the following example. "Consider . . . this problem: how many windows are there
in the house you live in? In all likelihood the way you answer this question is to
form a mental image of your home and then mentally count the windows." SOso,
supra note 69, at 242; see also Stephen Michael Kosslyn, The Medium and the
Message in Mental Imagery: A Theory, 88 PSYCHOL. REV. 46-66, 47 (1981). The
controversy arises when we ask how images are stored and represented in the
mind.
" It is interesting that the scientific debate is "polarized around an old philo.
sophical issue" about the role of imagery in knowledge. Paivio, supra note 68, at
3; see supra note 24. To simplify the debate somewhat, there are three basic theo-
ries about how the mind processes and recalls images. Under one theory, called
the radical-imagery hypothesis, images are stored in the mind as images: "visual
information is coded in terms of an internal "picture" that can be reactivated by
calling up the picture, as one might in looking at an album." SOLSO, supra note
69, at 245. The idea here is not that we store actual pictures in our mind, but
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however, "substantial agreement" that visual images are pro-
cessed differently in the mind from thoughts.! Recent eyewit-
ness identification studies provide evidence in support of this
view and, more generally, provide an interesting way to con-
ceptualize the relationship between image and ideology.
One recent study on eyewitness identification 3 reveals
that accurate facial recognition is associated with rapid, auto-
mated operations. Persons making an accurate identification of
the perpetrator of a staged crime are "more likely than their
inaccurate counterparts to state that their judgments resulted
from automatic recognition (e.g. 'His face just "popped out" at
me'). 4 Accurate witnesses are relatively unable to explain
how they made their identification, or to describe any explicit
rather a pattern of, say, electrical charges that corresponds to the visual. "[IWmages
are not languagelike 'symbolic' representations but bear a nonarbitrary correspon-
dence to the thing being represented ... .images are a special ind of represen-
tation that depicts information and occurs in a spatial medium . .. Kosslyn,
supra note 70, at 46. Under a second theory, called the conceptual.propositional
hypothesis, images are stored as thoughts: "visual information is fltered and sum.-
marized and stored as abstract 'statements' about the image. Reactivation of the
memory then would consist of recalling the abstract code, which in turn would
conjure up the subjective image associated with it.* SOLSO, supra note 69, at 245.
Under a third theory, called the dual-coding hypothesis, 'there are two classes of
phenomena handled cognitively by separate subsystems, one specialized for the
representation and processing of information concerning nonverbal objects and
events [imagery system], the other specialized for dealing with language (verbal
system]." Paivio, supra note 68, at 53-54; SOLsO, supra note 69, at 245. The dual-
coding hypothesis was developed during the 1960s by Allan Paivio and represents
the starting point for the debate.
The imagery-versus-propositional controversy heated up during the 1970s,
leading to mature statements of the radical-imagery and conceptual.propositional
hypotheses in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Sce Kosslyn, cupra note 70; Zonon
W. Pylyshyn, The Imagery Debate: Analogue Media Versus Tacit Knowledge, 88
PSYCHOL. REV. 16-45 (1981). Since that time, there has been little progress in
resolving the debate. If anything, the dual-coding theory has gained ground, in
part because of the prolific nature of its chief proponent. See Paivio, supra note
68; ALLAN PAIVIO, IMAGES IN INND: THE EVOLUTION OF A THEORY (1991). Thus, it
is fair to say today that "[w]bile researchers still debate the nature of the repre-
sentation of [visual and verbal codes], there is now substantial agreement that
some components of visual memories cannot be put into words." Jonathon W.
Schooler & Tonya Y. Engstler-Schooler, Verbal Ouershadowing of Visual Memories:
Some Things Are Better Left Unsaid, 22 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL 36-71, 37 (1990).
" Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, supra note 71, at 37.
' David Dunning & Lisa Berth Stern, Distinguishing Accurate From Inaccurate
Eyewitness Identifications Via Inquiries about Decision Processes, 67 J. PERSONALI-
TY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 818, 819 (1994).
7' Id. at 818.
1179
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
cognitive strategy that led them to the identification."5 In con-
trast, inaccurate witnesses more often use a deliberative pro-
cess of elimination and take longer to identify." More often,
they "report that they pursued explicit, deliberative procedures
when reaching their judgments, usually expressed in the form
of a process of elimination (e.g., 'I compared the photos to each
other to narrow the choices')."'" Thus, the study concludes
that "[alccurate eyewitness identifications can be distinguished
from erroneous ones in part by asking witnesses to describe
the decision processes that led to their judgments." 8 What
this study suggests is that mental images, such as images of
faces, are processed and stored separately than thoughts about
those images. "Faces are stored in memory in a visual pattern,
not in words."79
Other recent experimental studies on eyewitness identifi-
cation' reveal that verbal thoughts and visual images can
interfere with each other. One study refers to this as "verbal
overshadowing" of visual memories. In essence, the study re-
ports that when people are asked to provide verbal descriptions
of faces, it degrades their ability to recognize the faces accu-
rately, "demonstrat[ing] that verbalizing memory for the ap-
pearance of a face can actually impair subsequent recogni-
tion.""1 A review of several eyewitness studies similarly con-
cludes that visual recollections can be changed by subsequent,
verbal, misleading messages or questions.8" In one study it
was found that misleading questions about the existence of an
object that the subjects did not see "increased by a factor of six
the likelihood that the subject would later report having seen
the nonexistent [object] ."'
76 Id. at 830.
76 Id. at 831.
77 Id. at 819.
78 Id. at 818.
7" Daniel Goleman, Studies Point to Flaws in Lineups of Suspects, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1995, at C7 (quoting Dr. David Dunning); see also id. ("Images like a face
are stored in memory differently than are thoughts about that face").
' Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, supra note 71; David F. Hall, et al., Postevent
Information and Changes in Recollection for a Natural Event, in EYEWITNESS TES-
TIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 124 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus
eds., 1984).
81 Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, supra note 71, at 61.
D. F. Hall, et al., supra note 80, at 129.
D. F. Hall, et al., supra note 80, at 126.
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The second field of cognitive psychology, the study of
heuristics,' focuses on how we form beliefs concerning the
likelihood of uncertain events, such as the guilt of a criminal
defendant.' Amos Tversky and Daniel Kabneman have con-
ducted a number of studies which reveal that people rely on a
limited number of heuristic principles. One such principle is
called the "representativeness heuristic": our belief about the
outcome of any particular case will depend upon the resem-
blance of that case to a class of other cases. Studies suggest,
for instance, that we form opinions about a person by the de-
gree to which that person is representative of a stereotype of a
class of people. 6 Tversky and Kahneman provide the follow-
ing illustration:
consider an individual who has been described by a former neighbor
as follows: "Steve is very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful, but
with little interest in people, or in the world of reality. A meek and
tidy soul, he has a need for order and structure, and a passion for
detail." How do people assess the probability that Steve is engaged
in a particular occupation from a list of possibilities (for example,
farmer, salesman, airline pilot, librarian, or physican)?... In the
representativeness heuristic, the probability that Steve is a librari-
an, for example, is assessed by the degree to which he is representa-
tive of or similar to, the stereotype of a librarian.m "
Another heuristic device is called "the availability heuristic":
we form opinions about the probability of an uncertain event
"by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be
brought to mind." s Thus, for instance, we may form an opin-
ion about the guilt of a defendant based on our familiarity
' A heuristic is defined as:
a strategy, usually a simplifying strategy, which provides aid and guid-
ance in solving a problem. A heuristic is the opposite of an algorithm. In
deciding what move to make in a chess game, one could systematically
consider and evaluate every possible move. This would be an algorithmic
strategy. Or one could evaluate only the positions of pieces in the center
of the board and the most important pieces. That would be a heuristic
strategy.
Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudica-
tion: Trial by Heu stics, 15 LAW & Soc'Y. REV. 123, 131 n.l (1980.81).
" See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
3 (Daniel ]Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
8 Id. at 4.
7 Id. at 4.
Id. at 11.
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with, say, the escalation of domestic violence; or we "may as-
sess the risk of heart attack among middle-aged people by re-
calling such occurrences among one's acquaintances.
"89
These heuristic principles are generally useful, but can be
very misleading at times. They may cause serious errors be-
cause they fail to take into account probability theory and
other more reliable scientific accounts. The intuitive, common-
sense judgments made with these heuristic principles often
depart markedly from actual probabilities." In the case of
Steve, for instance, the fact that there are many more farmers
than librarians should be factored into the analysis, even
though it does not affect the similarity of Steve to the stereo-
type of a librarian." In simple terms, then, the inferences
that we draw in our daily experiences may be based on stereo-
types, biases and familiarities that can easily lead us astray.
Taken together, these two fields of cognitive psychology
provide a useful model for understanding the dynamic relation-
ship between image and ideology. The record in a criminal case
contains descriptions and facts about the criminal defendant.
These word descriptions trigger, in the mind of the reader, a
mental image of the defendant. The mental image that we
associate with the written description may not necessarily be
related one-to-one to the word description, but instead may
relate to other experiences that the reader may have had pre-
viously. It may resemble someone that the reader knows or
saw on television, in the newspaper, or on the street. For in-
stance, the trial record may describe "a young, widowed wom-
an with two loving children" and this description may trigger,
in the mind of the reader, an image of the reader's sister,
neighbor or of a television character. The record may describe
a "black male" and this may trigger a mental image of the
reader's brother, colleague, or of that recurrent police compos-
ite sketch of a young black man in a wool cap." In this sense,
Id. at 11.
o See Saks & Kidd, supra note 84, at 127.
91 Tversky & Kalmeman, supra note 85, at 4.
For instance, Susan Smith, who killed her children but blamed the crime on
an imaginary caijacker, described her "assailant" as "a black man, 20 to 30 years
old, of medium build, 5 feet 9 inches to 6 feet tall, and wearing jeans, a plaid
jacket or shirt and a dark blue knit ski cap." The newspaper account of the event
further reported:
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the mental image may be part stereotype.
The resulting mental image of the defendant becomes the
available data that the reader, as decisionmaker, uses in the
process of resolving the case. This mental image displaces or
overshadows the trial record-even though it may ignore some
word descriptions and embellish others through the process of
mental imagery. The mental image provides a facile heuristic
device from which the decisionmaker infers certain conclusions
about the defendant. In this way, the mental image can feed
back and distort thoughts about the defendant. If, for instance,
the reader's mental image of the "young widowed woman with
two loving children" resembles the reader's neighbor, then
additional facts or traits concerning that neighbor may be
mapped onto the decisionmaking process. Similarly, if the
reader's mental image of the "black male" resembles the
threatening composite police sketch, extraneous facts and emo-
tions may be injected into the thinking process.
Just like, in Tversky and Kahneman's example, the mental
image of a librarian may distort our thoughts about what occu-
pation Steve is engaged in, the mental images of the criminal
defendant may distort the process of resolving a criminal dis-
pute. Ultimately, mental images can create distance in the
adjudicative process because the parties to the dispute may
have entirely different mental images of the defendant. The
competing mental images may displace or overshadow the
record. Hidden from the decisionmaking process, the competing
mental images are not subject to full rational debate and scru-
tiny. In this way, image and ideology relate in a dynamic man-
ner that exerts centrifugal force in the adjudicative process.
These two fields of cognitive psychology provide insightful
parallels to the adjudicative process in the criminal law. Just
as thoughts about a face can distort the mental image in image
The man's race is important, investigators and residents said. It is a
reality of life here that a black man with two wailing white children
would draw attention to himself, said residents, both white and blacIL
The incident has put to a test the uneasy racial peace that ests in
this town and others like it. Two young white children are believed to
have been abducted by a black man, and a vague generic drawing is
taped to the window of every store.
Rick Bragg, Sense of Dread Now Pervades Frantic Search, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT file.
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theory, ideology can shape and distort mental images in the
adjudicative process. Similarly, just as mental images can
distort thought in heuristic theory, mental images can shape
and distort ideology in the judicial decisionmaking process. As
these parallels suggest, the study of criminal law adjudication
may benefit from critical insights from the experimental sci-
ences.
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II. IMAGES OF THE AccusED IN THE OPINIONS OF THE
ANTEBELLUM PERIOD, THE WARREN ERA AND THE
REHNQUIST COURT
In order to demonstrate the dynamic relationship between
imagery and ideology, and its effect on the adjudicative pro-
cess, it is necessary first to isolate the images of criminal de-
fendants. In this part, this Article examines the different imag-
es of the accused projected during three periods in American
legal history.
A. Images from the Southern Antebellum Period
The opinions of the southern antebellum period project a
wide range of images of slave defendants, from the obedient
and faithful servant to the rebellious and treasonous slave.
What the opinions have in common, however, is the chame-
leon-like nature of the slave: slaves who appear obedient can
reveal themselves to be rebellious; slaves who have committed
a crime-even a crime against a white person-can reveal
" Very promising work in this vein is currently being done by Dan Simon.
Simon is exploring a psychological perspective on judicial decisionmaking, empha-
sizing what he calls the "bi-directionality" of judicial reasoning and relying on
cognitive consistency theories. See Dan Simon, S..D. (dissertation in progress,
Harvard Law School); see also Blasi, supra note 68 at, 317. Blasi writes:
I suggest in this essay that as a consequence of developments over the
past decade in cognitive science, legal scholars now have the means to
consider empirically and systematically a fuller range of lawyering knowl-
edge and practice, including topics until now considered either simply un-
knowable or suitable only for speculation and bare assertion: judgment,
wisdom, expertise, and the relation of theory to lawyering practice.
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themselves to be faithful. The shifting nature of the slave de-
fendant is the consistent and distinct image of the antebellum
period.
The range of slave images is, in part, the product of two
fundamental tensions in the law of slavery. The first is a ten-
sion between the slave as property and the slave as person.
This tension traces its roots far back. It is reflected well in the
Federalist Papers where James Madison wrote that "[tihe Fed-
eral Constitution... decides with great propriety on the case
of our slaves, when it views them in the mixt character of
persons and of property."94 Much has been written about this
tension in the law of slavery. 5 A consensus has emerged that
it was essentially resolved in the criminal law and that slaves
were perceived as persons for purposes of the penal codes. 6
Many of the Southern appellate courts gave just that impres-
sion. The Alabama Supreme Court, for instance, held that "[a]
slave is a person, in the eye of the criminal law... ' The
South Carolina Supreme Court stated that "Negroes... have
wills of their own-capacities to commit crimes; and are re-
sponsible for offenses against society." Even Chief Justice
Taney, writing as circuit judge in Virginia, ruled that a slave
was a "person" for purposes of the criminal laws of the United
"' James Madison, The Federalist No. 54, in THE FEDERALMST 366, 368 (J.
Cooke ed., 1961); see also id. at 367 ("we must deny the fact that slaves are con-
sidered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The true state
of the case is, that they partake of both these qualities; being considered by our
laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects, as property").
" See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The 'Law Only As
An Enemy": The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and
Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 971 (1992); Fisher,
supra note 22, at 1054-55; Ariela Gross, 'Pandora's Box!. Slave Character on Trial
in the Antebellum South, at 1 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citing
THOMAS R. 1 COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNIT-
ED STATES OF AMERICA 83 (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968; reprint of
1858 ed.)); Terrence F. Kiely, The Hollow Words: An Experiment in Legal Histori-
cal Method as Applied to the Institution of Slavery, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 842 (1976);
Wilbert E. Mloore, Slave Law and the Social Structure, 26 J. NEGRO HIST. 171,
191-202 (1941).
1[""he 'double character of person and property' ... generally meant that
slaves were persons when accused of a crime, and property the rest of the tims."
Gross, supra note 95, at 1.
' Mose, a slave v. The State, 36 Ala. 211, 225 (1860). In Mose, the Attorney
General similarly argued that "[wihen a slave is charged with a crime, he lIons
the character of a chattel, and is viewed as a person." 1d. at 224.
1 State v. Simmons, 3 S.C.L. 5, (1 Brev.) 6, 8 (S.C. 1794).
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States, even though he is "the property of the master" and "not
a citizen."9'
This apparent resolution is an oversimplification, however.
Particularly with regard to images of slave defendants, there
still remained a significant tension in the criminal law be-
tween the slave as inanimate object and as human being. The
case of Flora, a slave v. The State,1°0 for instance, reflects viv-
idly the image of the defendant as property. Flora was accused
of murdering her master, Willis Sanford. There is, however, no
description of what happened or why she allegedly killed him.
The opinion in the case never humanizes Flora, and does not
discuss the facts in human terms. Flora is identified merely as
"the property of Allen and Richard Sanford, administrators of
the estate of Willis Sanford." 1 1
The reason is that Flora is a case about the institution of
chattel slavery. The criminal justice system in Alabama was
intimately interwoven with the institution of slavery and per-
formed a market function. Under Alabama law, whenever a
slave was found guilty of a capital offense and sentenced to
death, the same jury had to assess the value of the slave and
determine what portion the master should receive-which
could, in no case, exceed one-half of the value of the slave.'
If it was determined that the master shared blame for the
slave's conduct, then his portion of the slave's value would be
proportionally reduced. 103 Upon execution, the owner of the
slave was entitled to receive payment from the state treasury
for the assessed value. All the owner had to do was produce a
transcript of the trial record and a sheriffs certificate that the
slave had been executed.' The comptroller of public ac-
counts was bound by the documents and had no power to in-
quire who the owner was. 5 Accordingly, ownership had to
appear on the face of the indictment and be proven at tri-
" United States v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. 792, 809-10 (C.C.D. Va. 1859) (No. 14,445).
100 4 Port. 111 (Ala. 1836).
121 Id. at 111.
102 Act of 1824, §§ 1, 6, in J. AIXIN, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
ALABAMA CONTAINING ALL STATUTES OF A PUBLIC AND GENERAL NATURE, IN
FORCE AT THE CLOSE OF THE SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IN JANUARY
1833 (2d ed. 1836), Criminal Law §§ 60, 64, at 124 (hereinafter "AIKIN'S DIGEST").
1 AIKEN'S DIGEST, supra note 102, Criminal Law §§ 60, 64, at 124.
'9, Flora, 4 Port. at 112-13.
101 Id. at 113.
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al-otherwise, someone else could later claim an interest in the
slave from the treasurer.'06
At Flora's trial, no evidence was presented as to who her
owner was."° The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed her
conviction and sentence of death, ruling that there was a fatal
variance between the proof at trial and the indictment. The
court explained:
If the name of the owner had been omitted in the indictment, the
record would afford no evidence of the right of any person to receive
a part of the value of the slave... As [that] right... must appear
from the record, the fact of ownership on which the personal right
depends, as well as the fact of guilt, upon which the demand of pub-
lic justice is made, ought to be put in issue by the indictment, and
found by the jury."
Of course, what is missing entirely from this discussion is
the person, Flora. She figures in the caption, but we see her
nowhere in the opinion. This is the image of the slave as prop-
erty.0 9
Where slaves are portrayed as persons, a second funda-
mental tension riveted the law of slavery-a tension between
the slave that was not morally culpable (the vulnerable ser-
vant) and the morally indifferent slave (the cold-blooded mur-
derer). "An accepted premise of the times which we are study-
ing was that Negroes generally had a comparatively low stan-
dard of morals.""10 Moral deprivation, however, can cut two
ways. On the one hand, if the slave is by nature morally infe-
"' Id. at 114 ("As the owner may acquire rights from the trial of such an in-
dictment, his name, if it be known, must be stated in it, and proved on the trio].
The same principle applies, we think, to an indictment of a slave for a capital
offence.").
"' No evidence was presented "that administration upon the estate of Willis
Sanford had ever been granted to [Allen and Richard Sanford].7 Id. at 112.
' Id. at 113-14.
'0, Numerous other opinions portray this same image of the slave as property.
The slave in Ned, a slave v. The State, 7 Port. 187, 188 (Ala. 1838), for example,
is described merely as "the property" of his master. "[H]is value was assessed at
eight hundred dollars." Id. at 189. Ned does not receive the protection of the
declaration of rights. Id. at 214. He is neither fully person, nor fully non-person:
Ned is property. The same is true of the slave in The State v. Marshall, a slave,
8 Ala. 302 (1845). Marshall's identity as property is magnified in that particular
opinion by his own act of requesting his master "to purchase him." Id. at 309
(Collier, C. J., concurring).
no JAMES BENSON SELLERS, SLAVERY IN ALABAMA 242 (1950).
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rior, then her culpability for criminal activity is diminished.
The slave's weak moral fiber renders her less responsible for
breaking the law. On the other hand, the lack of moral con-
science can also project an image of a cold-blooded criminal.
Lack of remorse renders the criminal act more heinous, and
the perpetrator more threatening. This tension resulted in a
spectrum of images of the slave defendant, ranging from, at
one extreme, the slave defendant as obedient and faithful yet
ignorant servant to, at the other extreme, the slave defendant
as savage and highly threatening.
At the two extremes are what Terry Fisher describes as
"Sambo" and "Nat"-the two competing images of the slave
that vied for prominence in the literature and folklore of the
antebellum period. 'The first was the childlike and undepend-
able but loyal and unthreatening Sambo. 'Indolent, faithful,
humorous,... dishonest, superstitious, improvident, and musi-
cal, Sambo was inevitably a clown and congenitally docile."' "
The second image was the "fierce, rapacious, cunning, rebel-
lious, and vindictive" slave-Nat."' "Sambo, in short, was the
Fisher, supra note 22, at 1057-58 (1993) (quoting JOHN W. BLASSINOAME,
THE SLAVE COMMUNIT: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 225 (rev. ed.
1979)); see also ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 96 (1982) ("It]he
key to Sambo . . . is the total absence of any hint of 'manhood,' which in turn is
a perfect description of the dishonored condition"). The persistence of these images
is documented by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic in their article Images of
the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic
Social Ills?, supra note 18. Reviewing racial depictions over the past two centuries,
Delgado and Stefancic observe the "shocking parade of Sambos, mammies, coons,
uncles-bestial or happy-go.lucky, watermelon-eating-African Americans." Delgado
& Stefancic, supra note 18, at 1259. Delgado and Stefancic similarly discern both
the Sambo and the Nat images, noting that the images depict on the one hand
blacks "so incompetent, shuffling, and dim-witted that it is hard to see how they
survived to adulthood" and on the other hand "primitive, terrifying, larger.than-life
black men in threatening garb and postures, often with apparent designs on white
women." Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 18, at 1260. According to Delgado and
Stefancic, "[tihe first appearance of Sambo, a 'comic Negro' stereotype, occurred in
1781 in a play called The Divorce. This black male character, portrayed by a
white in blackface, danced, sang, spoke nonsense, and acted the buffoon." Delgado
& Stefancic, supra note 18, at 1262.
' Fisher, supra note 22, at 1058. The rebellious slave is presumably named
after Nat Turner, the leader of a slave rebellion executed in 1831. See HERBERT
APTHEKER, NAT TURNERS SLAVE REBELLION (1966). Curiously, Delgado and
Stefancic date the emergence of the "brutish and bestial" image to the Reconstruc-
tion period. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 18, at 1264. As Fisher and the cases
infra demonstrate, however, the image of the slave as traitor was projected during
the nineteenth century pre-Civil War period as well.
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central figure in white Southerners' fantasies of safety; Nat
was the central figure in their fantasies of rebellion." "
The faithful and obedient slave surfaces recurrently in the
criminal laws and opinions of antebellum Alabama. It is the
obedient slave that the legislature had in mind when it enact-
ed laws for the manumission of slaves. Under Alabama law, a
master could emancipate a slave "in consideration of long,
faithful and meritorious services performed.""' This image of
the obedient slave is illustrated well in the case of State v.
M'Donald.15 M'Donald, a free man, was charged with encour-
aging a slave rebellion by trying to persuade Moses, a slave, to
rise against his master and plot an escape to Texas. Moses,
however, informed his master of the plot early on and, by
drawing the traitor to a designated spot within earshot of his
master, assumed the role of confidential informant. The report-
er of decisions recounts that, at the trial, the master described
Moses as "faithful and obedient," and "the instrument of his
master." 6 The judge emphasized in his opinion that "[tihe
master of Moses stated that he was faithful and obedient; and
that he gave him the earliest information of the advances of
the prisoner;"" and concluded that "Moses never participat-
ed in any criminal design of the prisoner."'
The image of the obedient slave is also illustrated in The
State v. Abram, a slave."9 Abram was convicted and sen-
tenced to death for biting off a small portion of the ear of his
white overseer during a struggle. In an astonishing opinion,
the court ruled that Abram's mutilation was not willfully com-
mitted, and therefore did not constitute the capital offense of
mayhem, because he was engaged in mortal strife. Prominent
in the reporter's statement of fact was the fact that "Abram
sustained a good character, as an obedient servant."' As a
" Fisher, supra note 22, at 1059.
" AIEKN'S DIGEST, supra note 102, at 647 (Supp. 1834); sce also ACT OF 1834 §
1, in CLAYS DIGEST, supra note 6, Slaves and Free Persons of Color § 37, at 545
(emancipation "in consideration of long, faithful and meritorious services per-
formed.").
n5 4 Port. 449 (Ala. 1837).
no Id. at 453.
U? Id. at 461.
USId.
" 10 Ala. 928 (1847).
"2 Id. at 929.
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result, Abram, the obedient servant, was not placed on the
scaffold:
Slave though he be, and as such bound to obedience, and forbidden
to resist those having lawful authority over him, he is nevertheless a
human being, and when engaged in mortal strife, his adversary
armed with a deadly weapon, and he defenceless, the law, in com-
passion to the infirmity of our nature, and to the instinctive dread of
death, common alike to the bond and the free, would attribute such
a mutilation of the person of a white man to the instinct of self de-
fence, in which the will did not co-operate... To hold otherwise,
would indeed be to reduce the slave, to a level with the brute cre-
ation.'
Another aspect of the obedient slave image is ignorance.
Slave defendants are repeatedly referred to as "ignorant.""'
A good illustration of the image of ignorance can be seen in the
case of Bob, a slave v. The State."2 Bob was a slave accused
of assault with intent to kill a white person. Throughout the
opinion, Bob is repeatedly referred to as "an ignorant negro"
and "an ignorant slave.""24 The opinion evinces a clear image
of a pitiful slave at the mercy of the court:
An ignorant slave, knowing nothing of judicial proceedings, perhaps
not even understanding the nature of the duties discharged by the
different persons engaged in his trial, and confused by the unaccus-
tomed presence into which he was brought, and by the scenes tran-
spiring around him, might witness an offer of testimony against
him, and hear an argument upon its admissibility, without knowing
that the testimony was really offered to procure his conviction."
This image of the ignorant, but docile slave contrasts
sharply with the picture of the cold-blooded, evil slave at the
other end of the spectrum. This is the image of the run-away,
121 Id. at 932.
12 See, e.g., Bob, a slave v. The State, 32 Ala. 560, 567 (1858); Seaborn and
Jim v. The State, 20 Ala. 15, 17 (1852) ("[tlhe facts that [the defendants] were
slaves, and ignorant . . . "). And, the law was designed to keep slaves uneducated.
In Alabama, for instance, the education of slaves was made a criminal offense. See
AcT OF 1832 § 10, in AIKIN'S DIGEST, supra note 102, at Slaves and Free Persons
of Color § 31, at 397 ("any person or persons who shall attempt to teach any free
person of color, or slave, to spell, read, or write, shall, upon conviction thereof by
indictment, be fined in a sum not less than two hundred and fifty dollars, nor
more than five hundred dollars").
u2 32 Ala. 560 (1858).
124 Id. at 567.
12r Id. at 567-68.
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the rebellious slave who instigates slave insurrection. "[Miany
times slaves run away and lie out, hid, and lurking in swamps,
woods, and other obscure places, killing hogs, and committing
other injuries to the inhabitants of this state."' These are
the slaves that are "the brute creation,"M and not human be-
ings.
The case of Godfrey, a slave v. The State' projects this
image of a conniving, manipulative slave. Godfrey, a slave only
ten or eleven years of age, was accused of killing a four-year-
old child with a hatchet. The testimony at trial offered con-
flicting images of the young slave. Some described him as "a
smart, intelligent boy;, 'heap smarter than boys of twelve years
generally are."'M Others said, "he did not seem to be very
smart... "" What sealed Godfrey's fate, however, was that
he tried to pin the blame on "an Indian"-and, in this sense,
was conniving. Justice Walker's opinion for the court is subtle.
He does not explicitly state that Godfrey is deceitful. Yet, he
accedes to this image by juxtaposing Godfrey's case to those of
evil children:
A girl, thirteen years of age, was executed for killing her mistress.
... A boy of eight years of age, who had malice, revenge, and cun-
ning, was hanged for firing two barns. A boy of ten years old, who
showed a mischievous discretion, was convicted of murdering his
bed-fellow.... In [another] case... , a negro slave, of less than
twelve years, was convicted of murder, and the report of the case
informs us, that the defendant was executed."'
Godfrey, the young slave, revealed himself to be like these
other children--"cunning," "mischievous," and deceitful. Ulti-
mately, his image drips with the blood of his victim, "bloody,
on his shoulder, and on the back of his legs and feet."' This
is the image of the cold-blooded traitor. His moral deprivation
is an aggravating circumstance, not a mitigating factor.
z" Act of 1805 § 13 in CLAYS DIGEST, supra note 6, Slaves, and Free Percons
of Color § 15, at 541.
SThe State v. Abram, a slave, 10 Ala. 928, 932 (1847).
128 31 Ala. 323 (1858).
v Id. at 325.
o Id. at 326.
'3 Id. at 328-29.
132 Id. at 324.
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B. Imagery in the Warren Court Opinions
The decisions of the Warren Court, in contrast, project a
consistent image of the defendant as an impressionable and
vulnerable young adult, poor and uneducated, in need of pro-
tection from an overbearing police force. Special emphasis is
almost always placed on the traits that render the defendant
disadvantaged: poverty, race, lack of education, youth or men-
tal deficiency. "Elmer Davis is an impoverished Negro with a
third or fourth grade education.... Police first came in contact
with Davis while he was a child when his mother murdered
his father.""3 Danny Escobedo is "a 22-year-old of Mexican
extraction with no record of previous experience with the po-
lice.""3 Amos Reece is "a semi-illiterate Negro of low mentali-
ty."" Beatrice Lynumn is a single mother of two children on
ADC, threatened with the removal of her children if she does
not cooperate. 36 These are the defendants of the Warren
Court. The consistency and unitariness of the image is remark-
able.
The recurring theme is vulnerability. Chief Justice War-
ren, writing for the Court in Fikes v. Alabama,"7 describes
the defendant as "a Negro, 27 years old in 1953, who started
school at age eight and left at 16 while still in the third
grade... His mother testified that he had always been 'thick-
headed.'"" There was evidence he was "highly suggest-
ible."'39 Warren portrays him as "weaker," "more suscepti-
ble,"40 "weak of will or mind."' In Spano v. New York,'
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 742 (1966) (reversing conviction and
sentence of death because of improper admission of coerced confession obtained
during 16.day detention and interrogation).
"' Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 482 (1964) (reversing conviction where
defendant was denied opportunity to consult with counsel).
" Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89 (1955) (reversing conviction where no
African-American had served on the grand jury in Cobb County, Georgia, for the
previous 18 years).
'3 Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (reversing conviction for unlavfl
possession and sale of marijuana because of involuntary confession).
17 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (holding that confession obtained after five days in isola-
tion and extensive interrogation was involuntary).
'38 Id. at 193.
139 Id.
110 Id. at 197.
Il Id. at 198.
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Warren describes the defendant as "a foreign-born young man
of 25 with no past history of law violation... He had pro-
gressed only one-half year into high school and ... had a histo-
ry of emotional instability."' The defendant in Payne v. Ar-
kansas' is described as "a 19-year-old Negro with a fifth-
grade education."" 5 Emil Reck, the defendant in Reck v.
Pate' is described as "a nineteen-year-old youth of subnor-
mal intelligence,"'47 "young and ignorant":
Emil Reck at the age of twelve was classified as a "high grade men-
tal defective" and placed in an institution for mental defectives. He
dropped out of school when he was sixteen. Though he was retarded
he had no criminal record, no record of delinquency. At the time of
his arrest, confession, and conviction he was nineteen years old."0
The opinions also consistently emphasize youth and, more
importantly, treat youth as a mitigating circumstance. Youth
commands leniency and understanding. This is illustrated well
in Justice Douglas' opinion in Gallegos v. Colorado.' The
defendant there, Robert Gallegos, was only fourteen-years old
at the time of the commission of his offense. He was implicated
in a gruesome crime-one that many would regard as an adult
offense." Yet, Robert is portrayed as a mere child. Justice
'" Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (reversing conviction due to invol-
untary confession obtained after eight hours of continuous questioning while being
repeatedly denied the assistance of counsel).
1'3 Id. at 321-22.
31 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (holding confession involuntary where it was obtained
under threat of lynching after defendant was held incommunicado for three days,
with very little food).
", Id. at 562.
*' 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
,, Id. at 441 (holding confession involuntary where defendant was held virtual-
ly incommunicado for nearly four days, was deprived of food, was sick and faint
and subjected to relentless interrogation).
1I Id. at 443.
U Id. at 444-45 (Douglas, J., concurring).
'o 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (holding confession involuntary where 14-year-old boy was
held for five days without seeing a lawyer, parent or other friendly adult); see,
also, Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 231 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (defen-
dant was "a 19-year-old Negro"); Washington v. Texas, 388 US. 14, 15 (1967)
(defendant described as "an 18-year-old youth"); Townsend v. Sain, 372 US. 293,
297 (1963) ("Townsend was 19 years old at the time, a confirmed heroin addict
and a user of narcotics since age 15").
I"1 According to the state, Robert Gallegos and his cousin followed an elderly,
80-year-old man to a hotel, gained access to his room by ruse, and beat him about
the head and face with a shoe brush. They held a knife to his throat and took his
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Douglas describes him alternately as "a child of 14," " ' "only
14 years old,"" and as "a 14-year-old boy."" Justice Doug-
las quotes at length from a 1948 opinion involving a fifteen-
year-old defendant,55 in which the defendant is called alter-
nately a "15-year-old lad," a "15-year-old-boy," and "a lad in his
early teens."5 6 According to Douglas, "when, as here, a mere
child-an easy victim of the law-is before us, special care in
scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and
difficult age for a boy of any race."57 Douglas emphasizes
that "a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is un-
likely to have any conception of what will confront him when
he is made accessible only to the police."'
Poverty and race also feature prominently in the portraits
of criminal defendants. Warren characterizes the poor defen-
dant as "the person most often subjected to interrogation."1 9
Poor defendants are the most vulnerable: "the vast majority of
confession cases with which we have dealt in the past involve
those unable to retain counsel." 6° The focus on indi-
gence-what some members of the Court called the "new fetish
for indigency"' 1 -- symbolized vulnerability. In most decisions,
race also plays a leading role. The defendant in Payne v. Ar-
kansas is repeatedly defined as a "19 year-old Negro;" 62 the
defendant in Escobedo v. illinois is described as "a 22-year-old
of Mexican extraction;" and the defendants in Miranda v.
billfold, containing only 13 dollars. The elderly victim died several days later.
"' Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 49.
03 Id. at 53.
1 Id. at 54.
Id. at 53 (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (reversing conviction of
15-year-old defendant on the ground of an involuntary confession)).
1'Id.
" Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 53 (quoting Haley, 332 U.S. at 599-600).
"s Id. at 54.
169 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., 436, 473 (1966). See id. at 472 n.40 ("Esti-
mates of 50-90% indigency among felony defendants have been reported."). During
oral argument in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Chief Justice Warren
asked the state's attorney: "I suppose out of those fifty-two hundred prisoners now
in your jails who were not represented by counsel, that a vast majority of them
are not only poor but are illiterate. Would that be a fair observation?" MAY iT
PLEASE THE COURT 191 (Peter Irons & Stephane Guitton eds., 1993).
160 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472.
161 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 359 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
162 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 561-62 (1958).
16 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 482 (1958).
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Arizona are described as an "indigent Mexican defendant7"'
and "an indigent Los Angeles Negro.""
Criminal defendants are also portrayed as impressionable.
Douglas, concurring in Mapp v. Ohio, introduces the defendant
like a character in a novel: "She lived alone with her fifteen-
year-old daughter in the second-floor flat of a duplex in Cleve-
land."1" Douglas explains how the police officers broke into
her home and, in response to her request to see a search war-
rant, waved a paper in front of her face. "She grabbed it and
thrust it down the front of her dress."" She was handcuffed,
manhandled, and "forced to sit on the bed." "s As the officers
"ransacked" through her apartment, she was "a prisoner in her
own bedroom." 69 The literary style of the opinion-mixed
with subtle sexual connotations-creates a picture of a vulner-
able woman rendered defenseless by brutal police officers.
Remarkably, these images of the defendant in the Warren
era remain constant across a spectrum of variables-in land-
mark decisions 70 as well as in the more remote per curiam
opinions;' and across the spectrum of legal issues." What
16' Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
165 Id. The fact that the Warren Court used race to portray the defendant as
vulnerable is paternalistic toward the individual defendant and toward black peo-
ple in general. It contrasts sharply with the Rehnquist Court's use of race to por-
tray the defendant as threatening. See infra notes 213-228 and accompanying text.
By focusing on the racial imagery of the criminal defendant, I am not suggesting
that either court was "enlightened" about racism in the criminal justice system.
The use of racial imagery by both courts only aggravated racial bias in the crim-
inal justice system. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases 67
TUL. L. REV. 1739, 1798 (1993) (proposing a racial imagery shield law on the
model of rape shield laws).
M app v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 667 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
167Id.
's Id. at 668.
16I Id.
170 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (an "indigent Mexican
defendant" and "an indigent Los Angeles Negro who had dropped out of school in
the sixth grade"); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 482 (1958) (a 22-year-old of
Mexican extraction with no record of previous experience with the police").
171 See, e.g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 US. 404, 407 (1967) (per curiam) (defendant
is "an illiterate, with only a third grade education, whose mental capacity is decid-
edly limited") (holding confession involuntary where illiterate defendant was held
incommunicado for eight hours, not fed and possibly subjected to physical abuse;
also sustaining challenge to grand and petit jury pools for underrepresentation of
blacks).
112 See, eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441 (1966) (right against self-in-
crimination); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 231 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)
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is equally remarkable is that these cases involve gruesome
crimes. The crime in Davis was an "atrocious" case of rape-
murder,'73 involving a rape in a cemetery by an escaped
convict.'74 The victim in Payne was an elderly, working man
who was found in his office "dead or dying from crushing blows
inflicted upon his head."'75 The Reck case involved the "sav-
age murder" 6 of a Chicago physician. Nevertheless, the im-
age of the defendant remains that of the vulnerable and weak
individual.
The Image of the Police Officer
Acting as a foil to this image, the police officer is portrayed
as overbearing, brutal and manipulative, far more interested in
extracting unreliable confessions than in investigating crimes.
The tools of his trade are trickery, deceit, seclusion, fatigue,
and, often, physical brutality. The opinions of the Warren
Court consistently refer to "overbearing" police officers 77 and
depict the police "manhandling" female suspects,' "ransack-
ing" apartments,'79  and "[riunning roughshod" over
rights.8 ° The typical police officer has a "perceived need to
maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim some-
times accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to un-
dermine police control of the streets." 8' In the confession ar-
(jury challenge); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 297 (1963) (habeas corpus);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1958) (right to presence of counsel during
interrogation); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89 (1955) ("a semi-illiterate Negro of
low mentality") (jury composition challenge).
' Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 738.39 (1966).
174 Id. at 742.
.7. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 562 (1958).
s Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 448 (1961) (Clark, J., dissenting).
1 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966) (defendant's rights in
Escobedo "were put in jeopardy in that case through official overbearing"); Haynes
v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963) ("[o]fficial overzealousness of the type
which vitiates the petitioner's conviction below has only deleterious effects"); Reck,
367 U.S. at 442 ("it is equally true that Reck's youth, his subnormal intelligence,
and his lack of previous experience with the police make it impossible to equate
his powers of resistance to overbearing police tactics with those of the defendants
in [other cases]").
17' Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 667, 668 (1961) ("putting their hands on appellant").
179 Id.
180 Id. at 645.
... Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 n.11 (quoting L. TIFFANY, ET AL., DETECTION
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ea in particular, the Court repeatedly rebuked police officers
for trying to coerce confessions instead of independently inves-
tigating cases."82 The constant refrain is that "confessions
have often been extorted to save law enforcement officials the
trouble and effort of obtaining valid and independent evidence
"183
A fascinating, recurring image of the police officer is that
of the Communist authority figure. Justice Goldberg, writing
for the Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, compares interrogation
without counsel to trial in the former Soviet Union: "[t]he Sovi-
et criminal code does not permit a lawyer to be present during
the investigation. The Soviet trial has thus been aptly de-
scribed as 'an appeal from the pretrial investigation.' ""'
Similarly, Justice Douglas compares incommunicado police
detention in the United States to "the secret of successful in-
terrogation in Communist countries."" Douglas explains
how, "[uin the Leninist period," extended interrogation by per-
sons ascribing to Marxist doctrine often resulted in a conver-
sion by the subject "to the ideas and beliefs of the interroga-
tor."'86
Not all Justices acceded to these images of the police.
Justice White, dissenting in Escobedo v. Illinois, accused the
majority of "a deep-seated distrust of law enforcement officers
everywhere... "'7 Nevertheless, the image of the overbear-
OF CRIME: STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMAENT
AND ENTRAPIMeNT 47-48 (1967)).
"' Prosecutors were also not immune. Justice Goldberg sketches in Escobedo v.
Ilinois the following portrait of a prosecutor. "One can imagine a cynical prosecu-
tor saying: [Let them have the most illustrious counsel, now. They cant escape the
noose. There is nothing that counsel can do for them at the trial." Escobedo, 378
U.S. at 488 (quoting Ex parte Sullivan, 107 F. Supp. 514, 517-18 (CIM. Utah
1952)).
' Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963); se afro Escobedo, 378 Us.
at 488-89 ("[we have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a
system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confession' will,
in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which
depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through sdful investiga-
tion).
' Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 US. 482, 488 n.9 (1958) (quoting FEIFER, JUSTICE
IN MOSCOW 86 (1964)).
1 Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 446 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 447 (quoting KENNEDY, THE SCIENTIFIC LESSONS OF INTERROGATION,
PROC. Roy. INTN. 38, No. 170 (1960)).
"' Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 498 (White, J., dissenting); cee alco United States v.
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ing and bullying officer acted as a constant foil to that of the
vulnerable and impressionable criminal defendant. The con-
trast is nowhere sharper that in Beecher v. Alabama.8 '
Beecher, "a Negro convict," escaped from "a road gang" operat-
ing out of Camp Scottsboro, Alabama-a rich word description
if there ever was one. The next day, a white woman's 'ifeless
body" was found near the prison camp.'89 Beecher was hunt-
ed down and captured in Tennessee, and made to confess,
literally, at gunpoint:
Tennessee police officers saw the petitioner as he fled into an open
field and fired a bullet into his right leg. He fell, and the local Chief
of Police pressed a loaded gun to his face while another officer point-
ed a rifle against the side of his head. The Police Chief asked him
whether he had raped and killed a white woman. When he said that
he had not, the Chief called him a liar and said, "If you don't tell the
truth I am going to kill you." The other officer then fired his rifle
next to the petitioner's ear, and the petitioner immediately con-
fessed."
Beecher did not receive proper medical care and his leg
was later amputated. But before that, his leg had "become so
swollen and his wound so painful that he required an injection
of morphine every four hours."19' While he was still in that
condition, five days after his capture, the medical assistant in
charge left Beecher with two state investigators for a ninety-
minute interrogation, telling them to inform him if Beecher did
not "tell them what they wanted to know."'92 During that in-
terrogation--"in a 'kind of slumber' from his last morphine
injection, feverish, and in intense pain"--Beecher signed writ-
ten confessions that were admitted at trial over objection.'93
The graphic imagery in Beecher is striking94 and it re-
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 252 (1966) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part) ("I do not share this pervasive distrust of all official investigations").
389 U.S. 35 (1967).
1S9 Id.
o Id. at 36.
19 Id.
192 Id.
Beecher, 389 U.S. at 37.
2) The same term, the Court decided Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967),
another graphic case. Bennie Brooks was also a state convict, this time accused of
participating in a riot in a Florida prison. Aier the riot, Brooks was ordered con-
fined to a "windowless sweatbox" for 35 days. Id. at 413-14. Stripped naked,
Brooks was confined to a tiny cell, with two other inmates, without a bed or any
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flects the recurring themes of powerless criminal defendants
and overbearing police officers that pervaded the criminal law
opinions of the Warren Court.
C. Imagery In The Rehnquist Court Opinions
In sharp contrast, the Rehnquist Court opinions consis-
tently project an image of the criminal defendant as a deeply
threatening, cold-blooded and, most often, recidivist individu-
al.' The opinions are rich with depictions of heinous crimes
and gory crime scenes. What used to be mitigating characteris-
tics-youth, poverty, race-are now turned against the defen-
dant. Youth makes the crime worse; it reveals, prematurely,
the defendant's inherently savage nature. Poverty is associated
with frivolous appeals. Race projects the threatening specter of
the "black male."
The masterful use of imagery in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Payne v. Tennessee..8 illustrates well the radical
change. Rehnquist's use of imagery is particularly interesting
furnishings or facilities "except a hole flush with the floor which served as a com-
mode." Id. He was fed 'peas and carrots in a soup form--as the Court described,
"a daily fare of 12 ounces of thin soup and eight ounces of water? Id. at 414.
After two weeks in the sweatbox, Brooks confessed and his confession was admit-
ted at trial Id. The Court described the conditions in Brooks as "a shocIing dis-
play of barbarism." Id. at 415.
"' This shift in imagery coincides with a fundamental shift in the criminal
docket of the Supreme Court. It would be wrong, however, to attribute to the shift
in the criminal docket responsibility for the shift in imagery. To be sure, the War-
ren Court labored intensely over issues such as coerced confessions, jury composi-
tion, and the rights of indigent defendants, whereas the Rehnquist Court has
changed the focus of the criminal docket toward inter alia federal habeas corpus,
the harmless error doctrine, and exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. This shift
in the criminal docket, however, does not account for the difference in imagery.
Coerced confession cases do lend themselves well to vivid depictions of the crimi-
nal defendant. However, that fact can cut both ways: the defendant could be char-
acterized as vulnerable, but she could also be characterized as manipulative. The
consistency of the imagery in the coerced confession cases of the Warren era re-
flects the predominance of the theme of vulnerability. If the Warren Court had a
different image of the defendant, the coerced confession cases would have empha-
sized different attributes. What is missing from the gallery of Warren Court deci-
sions is an image of the defendant as manipulative, evil and cold-blooded. This
fact is particularly significant given the number of confession cases the Warren
Court reviewed-cases which, as noted, lend themselves to detailed descriptions of
the criminal defendant.
"1 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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because it goes so much further than the legal analysis would
require. Pervis Tyrone Payne was convicted of brutally mur-
dering a young mother and her two-year-old daughter, and as-
saulting her three-year-old son, Nicholas, who miraculously
survived.'97 At the jury sentencing trial, Nicholas's grand-
mother testified about how badly he missed his mother and
sister.'98 The prosecutor argued that the murder was espe-
cially heinous because of the harm to Nicholas, urging the jury
to return a death verdict so that Nicholas would some day
know that justice was done.'99 The legal question presented
was whether this "victim-impact evidence" detracted from the
central mission of the death penalty phase.2"0
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the court, paints a
graphic image of a particularly gruesome crime and "a horrify-
ing scene."'" "Blood covered the walls and floor throughout
the unit."20 2  The mother, twenty-eight-year-old Charisse
Christopher, died of bleeding from eighty-four knife wounds
"caused by 41 separate thrusts of a butcher knife."'°3 Her
daughter, Lacie, "suffered stab wounds to the chest, abdomen,
back and head. The murder weapon, a butcher knife, was
found at her feet.' °4 As for three-year-old Nicholas:
Nicholas, despite several wounds inflicted by a butcher knife that
completely penetrated through his body from front to back, was still
"7 Id. at 812-13.
"8 Id. at 814.
19 Id. at 815.
200 Id. at 817.
20 Payne, 501 U.S. at 812. The Court's focus on the crime scene--like the War-
ren Court's focus on coercive measures-represents conscious or unconscious inter-
pretive constructs of timeframing: "lain interpreter can readily focus solely on the
isolated criminal incident, as if all we can learn of value in assessing culpability
can be seen with that narrower time focus." Kelman, supra note 16, at 594; see
also John 0. Cole, Thoughts from the Land of And, 39 MERCER L. REV. 907, 914-
16 (1988) (by choosing from shifting "frames" of reference the author can create
the criminal defendant guilty or innocent). These image constructs have also been
interpreted as narratives that focus on the story of the crime. See Robin West,
Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases from
the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 161 (1990) (describing how the
conservative members of the Rehnquist Court use narratives of the crime and the
defendant's participation in the crime to project an image of the guilty and blame-
worthy defendant).
202 Payne, 501 U.S. at 812.
s0 Id. at 813.
214 Id. at 813.
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breathing. Miraculously, he survived, but not until after undergoing
seven hours of surgery and a transfusion of 1,700 cc's of blood-400
to 500 cc's more than his estimated normal blood volume.'
It is impossible to read these stirring words and not be
overwhelmed by sorrow for the victims and anger at Pervis
Tyrone Payne. In very subtle ways, the opinion fuels this an-
ger. Whereas most modem judicial opinions refer to the "as-
sailant" (or some other neutral noun that does not identify who
actually committed the crime) when describing the crime,
Rehnquist refers directly to "Payne" when recounting the crim-
inal incident."' Moreover, throughout the opinion, Rehnquist
refers to the victims by their first names-Charisse, Lade and
Nicholas-though he refers to the defendant by his last name
only. This is a device typically used by litigators to humanize
their client, and dehumanize the opponent.
Payne is portrayed as a monster. When he left the crime
scene, he was "so covered with blood that he appeared to be
'sweating blood."" The afternoon of the crime, he was inject-
ing cocaine, drinking beer, and reading pornographic maga-
zines. When he was apprehended, he was described as hav-
ing 'a wild look about him. His pupils were contracted. He
was foaming at the mouth, saliva. He appeared to be very
nervous. He was breathing real rapid. ' " 9 Although
Rehnquist reviews the mitigating evidence presented at the
penalty phase, somehow it does not wash. Perhaps as a result
of ineffective trial counsel, poor witnesses, or more likely an
unreceptive court, the mitigating evidence is not portrayed
with any compelling force. Rehnquist rattles off the evidence
with little persuasive effect."0 Its narrative effect pales in
=' Id. at 812.
s See, e.g., id. at 812 ("Charisse resisted and Payne became violent").
Payne, 501 U.S. at 812.
21 Id. at 812.
21 Id. at 813 (citation omitted).
210 Rehnquist recites the mitigating evidence as follows:
The capital sentencing jury heard testimony from Payne's girlfriend that
they met at church; that he was affectionate, caring, and hind to her
children; that he was not an abuser of drugs or alcohol; and that it was
inconsistent with his character to have committed the murders. Payne's
parents testified that he was a good son, and a clinical psychologist testi-
fied that Payne was an extremely polite prisoner and suffered from a low
IQ. None of this testimony was related to the circumstances of Payne's
brutal crimes.
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comparison to the image of Nicholas' blood transfusions, or, for
that matter, to the image of Payne "sweating blood."
In a surprising tour-de-force, Rehnquist appropriates the
image of the vulnerable criminal defendant from the Warren
Court, and projects it onto the real victim, the victim of the
crime. Charisse, Nicholas's deceased mother, is the one por-
trayed as vulnerable, disadvantaged, all too human: "[tihe
evidence showed that the victim was an out-of-work, mentally
handicapped individual, perhaps not, in the eyes of most, a
significant contributor to society, but nonetheless a murdered
human being."' The decision reflects how the earlier image
of the vulnerable defendant is redeployed in a radically differ-
ent context.
Rehnquist's opinion in MuMin v. Virginia212 projects a
similar image of a cold-blooded, highly threatening, recidivist
criminal. Mr. Mu'Min was "an inmate at the Virginia Depart-
ment of Corrections' Haymarket Correctional Unit serving a
48-year sentence for a 1973 first-degree murder convic-
tion.""'5 He would have been eligible for the death penalty on
the 1973 murder conviction had it not been for the Supreme
Court decision declaring the death penalty unconstitutional in
1972.214 The reader can surmise from a voir dire question
that Dawud Mjid Mu'Min is Muslim and black. 1' Mr.
Mu'Min was transferred to a work detail supervised by the
Virginia Department of Transportation ('YDOT"), from which
he escaped. 16 Using "a sharp instrument that he fashioned
at the VDOT shop," he stabbed, robbed, sexually assaulted and
murdered a woman at a retail carpet store in a shopping cen-
ter near the VDOT facility."1 7 After the brutal murder--"a
Id. at 825-26.
211 Id. at 823-24.
2- 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (holding that due process does not require content-based
voir dire regarding exposure to pretrial publicity).
21 Id. at 418.
214 Id. at 418.
216 Id. at 421.
216 Id. at 418.
212 Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 418. The victim was "discovered in a pool of blood,
with her clothes pulled off and semen on her body." Id. at 436 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Mu'Min confessed to having stabbed the victim "twice with a steel spike,
once in the neck and once in the chest." Id.
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macabre act of senseless violence"2 8-- Mr. Mu!Min returned
and ate a hot lunch at his unit.2 Mr. Mu!Min had been re-
jected for parole six times before the second murder and had
numerous prior prison infractions.' His case engendered
much publicity because it occurred during the 1988 presiden-
tial campaign and the controversy over Willie Horton."1 The
imagery, again, conveys an evil nature.
The defendant in New York v. Quarles' is described
through the eyes of the victim, a woman who says she has just
been raped. Quarles is "a black male, approximately six feet
tall, who was wearing a black jacket with the name 'Big Ben'
printed in yellow letters on the back 2' 2-a graphic word de-
scription if there ever was one. Mr. Quarles was found in the
possession of an empty holster. It is unclear from the opinion
why this image-and no other-is portrayed. The defendant in
Quarles was not charged or convicted of rape, but instead was
charged with possession of a weapon. Justice Marshall's dis-
senting opinion makes clear that an equally valid recitation of
facts avoids any reference to the "threatening" features of the
defendant or to the alleged rape. 4 In this sense, the image
of Quarles articulated by the majority is somewhat gratuitous.
Although it mirrors and serves to legitimate the legal holding
of the case-which creates a public-safety exception to
Miranda-the image is not, strictly speaking, necessary to the
legal analysis.
The opinions of the Rehnquist Court also give different
meaning to youth and poverty. Youth is no longer a vulnerabil-
ity;, to the contrary, the youth of an offender can be a mark
against him. Committing a heinous crime as a child exposes
the evil nature of the offender. In fact, the Rehnquist Court ex-
plicitly recognizes that "a juror might view the evidence of
youth as aggravating, as opposed to mitigating."' Poor de-
11 Id. at 432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
219 Id. at 418.
22 Id. at 418.
=2 Id. at 429.
467 U.S. 649 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.) (creating a public safety exception to the
requirement that Miranda warnings be given).
22 Id. at 651.
=' See id. at 674 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2669 (1993) (ruling that the Texas "spe-
cial issues" death penalty instructions do not violate the E3ghth Amendment with
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fendants are portrayed as a public nuisance. Indigence is asso-
ciated with frivolous certiorari petitions, meritless habeas
corpus applications, and frivolous section 1983 prisoner's rights
cases." Indigent prisoners raise "fantastic or delusional sce-
narios, claims with which federal district judges are all too
familiar." 7
The Image of the Police Officer
Like the Warren Court opinions, the images of the police
officer in the opinions of the Rehnquist Court act as a foil. The
police are described as trustworthy public servants. Police
officers are presumed to have healthy instincts and to act in
good faith. This is illustrated well in Quarles where the court
writes that "[tihe exception which we recognize today [to
Miranda v. Arizona] ... will simply free [police officers] to
follow their legitimate instincts when confronting situations
presenting a danger to the public safety."
Illinois v. Perkins' reflects the Court's deference to po-
lice methods. In Perkins, an undercover police officer is placed
in a jail cell with the defendant, Perkins. The defendant is
suspected of murder, but awaiting trial on another offense, and
confesses to the undercover officer. The contrast between the
majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, and the opinions
of Justices Brennan and Marshall, reveals a fundamental dif-
ference in attitudes toward the police. Brennan describes the
police activity in a manner resembling the opinions of the
Warren Court: "The deliberate use of deception and manipula-
tion by the police appears to be incompatible 'with a system
that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not
regard to the consideration of youth as a mitigating circumstance); see also Gra.
ham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993).
"6 In Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992), the Court went so far as to
allow district courts to "pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations" in in
forma pauperis complaints and dismiss the complaint where the facts appear fanci.
ful-even though there has been no testing of the facts whatsoever.
21 Id. at 32 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989)); see also id.
at 33 ("we are confident that the district courts, who are 'all too familiar' with
factually frivolous claims ... are in the best position to determine which cases
fall into this category").
22 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 (1984).
229 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
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be secured by inquisitorial means... "' Marshall empha-
sizes the coercive nature of incarceration: "the pressures
unique to custody allow the police to use deceptive interroga-
tion tactics to compel a suspect to make an incriminating
statement."' Kennedy, however, has no qualms about the
police method: the defendant was merely "convers[ing] with
someone who happen[ed] to be a government agent.'" Jail-
house deception is not coercion, it is "mere strategic deception
[that takes] advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust in one he
supposes to be a fellow prisoner.' m
The competing imagery produces two very different por-
traits of the defendant. For the Rehnquist majority, Lloyd
Perkins is an armed and dangerous, cold-blooded, recidivist
killer with no redeeming features. He "boast[s]"' about hav-
ing "done!' somebody, is anxious to escape jail, and is pre-
pared to "smuggle in a pistol."' For Brennan and Marshall,
however, Perkins is an impressionable defendant, scared, and
prepared to engage in 'jailhouse bravado' to escape sexual
or physical assault. These two pictures capture well the dis-
tinct imagery of the Warren and Rehnquist Courts.
Ill. IDEOLOGIES OF CRIMINAL LAW DURING THE SOUTHERN
ANTEBELLUM PERIOD, THE WARREN ERA AND THE
REHNQUIST COURT
The opinions from the three historical periods also evince
remarkable internal consistency regarding their respective
ideologies of criminal law. In this part, the Article will focus on
the ideologies prevalent during these three periods.
I' d. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 308 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
m2 Id. at 297.
2' Id. at 297.
- Perkins, 496 U.S. at 298.
25 Id. at 295 (i.e., killed someone).
2' Id. at 295.
Id. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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A. The Southern Antebellum Period
During the antebellum period, the price of field-hand
slaves rose almost in proportion to the decline in the price of
cotton." The cost of an errant slave was even higher. If exe-
cuted, the slaveholder stood to lose at least half the value of
the slave. The owner of a slave charged with a capital offense
was required to retain counsel for the slave at his own ex-
pense." 9 The owner of a slave convicted on a noncapital of-
fence was responsible for the costs of prosecution; if the owner
did not pay the costs within ten days, the slave could be sold
by the sheriff to cover the expenses. 40 When a slave was ac-
"s Andrew Fede, Legitimized Violent Slave Abuse in the American South, 1619-
1865: A Case Study of Law and Social Change in Six Southern States, 29 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 93, 108 (1985). The price of a prime field hand in Georgia in 1800
was $450 and the average New York price of upland cotton was 30 cents. In 1859,
the price of a slave averaged $1,650 and the price of cotton had fallen to 11 cents.
"' Throughout the nineteenth century antebellum period, slaves charged with a
capital offense in Alabama were afforded legal counsel at trial at their owner's
expense. As early as 1807, a slave could not be condemned unless he or she was
allowed "counsel in his or her defence, whose fee, amounting to ten dollars, shall
be paid by the owner of the slave." Act of 1807 § 57, in H. TOULMIN, A DIGEST
OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA CONTAINING THE STATUTES AND RESoLU-
TIONS IN FORCE AT THE END OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN JANUARY, 1823 (1823),
Courts Inferior, ch. 4 § 57, at 182 (hereinafter "TOULMIN'S DIGEST"). The slave's
right to counsel at his owner's expense survived the adoption of the Alabama
Constitution of 1819, although it was not incorporated therein. The criminal proce-
dure laws enacted after the Constitution uniformly provided for appointed counsel
at capital trials. See, e.g., Act of 1819 § 2, in TOULMIN'S DIGEST, Courts Inferior,
supra, ch. 7 § 2, at 186. (right to counsel, "whose fee, amounting to ten dollars,
shall be paid by the owner of the slave"); Act of 1824 § 4, in AIKIN'S DIGEST,
supra note 102, Criminal Law, Trial of Persons of Color § 62, at 124 ("li]f the
owner of any slave charged with a capital offence, shall fail to employ good and
sufficient counsel, on behalf of said slave, it shall be the duty of the presiding
judge, before whom such slave may be tried, to assign counsel learned in the law
to defend said slave, who shall be entitled to receive from the owner the sum of
twenty dollars for his services"); Act of 1832 § 5, in AIKIN'S DIGEST, supra note
102, Criminal Law, Trial of Persons of Color § 70, at 125 (court appointed counsel
at owner's expense); Penal Code of 1843, ch. 15, in CLAY'S DIGEST, supra note 6,
Of Slaves and Free Negroes § 13, , at 473 ("[i]f the owner of any slave should
neglect or refuse to employ counsel to defend the prisoner, the court shall assign
counsel for that purpose, who shall be authorized to demand from the owner ten
dollars for this service"); Ala. Code of 1852, § 3329 ("[i]n all trials of slaves for
capital offenses, if the owner refuses or neglects to employ counsel for his defence,
the court must assign counsel for that purpose, who must be paid twenty dollars
therefor, to be taxed as costs, for which execution may issue").
Act of 1843 § 2, in CLAYS DIGEST, supra note 6, Penal Code of Slaves and
Free Negroes § 28, at 476; Act of 1852, § 3331.
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cused of crime, the slaveholder faced sure financial loss."'
A close reading of the judicial opinions and criminal laws
from antebellum Alabama reveals that the courts and legisla-
tures resolved this dilemma by placing wide discretion in the
hands of slaveholders. The trial process was, by and large,
turned over to the slaveholders. The overarching ideological
thread in the criminal law was that slaveholders were best
suited to judge slaves. Because of the ambiguous relationship
between slavery and the criminal process-a process that had
the potential of draining slaveholders' time, resources and
(human) capital-the penal laws and procedures were not
inflexibly repressive, but, to the contrary, were designed to
allow slaveholders the flexibility to use the criminal process as
an arm of the institution of chattel slavery. This is demonstrat-
ed in a number of different ways.
First, slaveholders participated in the slave criminal pro-
cess via the slave's right to a jury trial. This represented a
gradual evolution in the law of slavery in Alabama and reflects
well the interests of the slaveholders. Before Alabama gained
statehood in 1819, the general assembly of the Mississippi
Territory passed a succession of criminal procedure laws that
denied slaves the procedural rights associated with trial by
jury. One of the first such laws, passed in 1807, established
special tribunals for the trial of slaves without juries.2 2 The
Act of 1807 provided that the justices of the county court--a
I As the Alabama Supreme Court explained, the slaveholder had an "interest
to prevent a conviction, the consequence of which would be, the certain loss of one
half his value, and the possible loss of his entire value." The State v. Marshall, a
slave, 8 Ala. 302, 307 (1845). In fact, the financial loss associated with the execu-
tion of a slave was viewed as the only way to ensure that owners made sure that
their slaves received a fair trial. During the 1842-43 legislative session, the gener-
al assembly passed a bill providing for full compensation for executed slaves. The
Governor, Benjamin Fitzpatrick, vetoed the provision because it eliminated any
incentive to guarantee slaves a fair trial. In a veto message to the general assem-
bly, the Governor wrote that "[hiumanity alone, as the statute now stands, is the
only inducement to the master to take that interest which is essential to insure
his slave a fair and impartial trial when implicated." Flag of the Union, December
7, 1842 (cited in SELLERS, supra note 110, at 244). That was not enough.
An Act for the Punishment of Crimes and Misdemeanors, passed February 6,
1807 § 5757, in TOULMIN'S DIGEST, supra note 239, at 182. The Act provided for
the right to counsel for slaves and required that counsel's fee "amounting to ten
dollars, shall be paid by the owner of the slave." An Act for the Punishment of
Crimes and Misdemeanors, passed February 6, 1807 § 5757, in TOUIm; 's DIGEST,
supra note 239, at 182.
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court inferior to the circuit court, where white defendants were
tried-would be 'Justices of oyer and terminer for trying slaves,
charged with treason, felony, or other crimes or
misdemeanours" and would do so '%vithout juries."" In 1812,
the general assembly did enact procedures for the trial of
slaves in county court by petit juries."' However, this act dis-
pensed with many formalities of trial by jury, including pre-
sentment or indictment before a grand jury, 5 the right to
confront witnesses, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses, or to be free from self-incrimination.24
Once Alabama gained statehood in 1819, slaves were guar-
anteed trial by jury in felony cases. The Alabama Constitution
of 1819 explicitly guaranteed slaves the right to "an impartial
trial by a petit jury" in the prosecution for crimes of a higher
grade than petit larceny. u7 Nevertheless, repeated attempts
were made to diminish the trial rights of slaves and to stream-
line the slave adjudicatory process until the middle part of the
century. Three days after Alabama gained statehood, the legis-
lature passed a criminal procedure law for slaves which provid-
ed a summary mode of trial in the inferior court.24 Similarly,
by an Act of 1832, "to provide for the speedy trial of slaves and
free persons of color,"' 9 the legislature reverted jurisdiction
to the inferior county courts to try slaves without the benefit of
indictment or presentment."0 A petit jury, counsel and com-
pulsory process were guaranteed, but few other protections
were afforded the slave."' This act of 1832 was repealed in
TOULMIN'S DIGEST, supra note 239.
'"An Act prescribing a Summary Mode for the Trial of Slaves passed Decem-
ber 21, 1812 § 1, in TOULMIN'S DIGEST, supra note 239, at 183.
46 TOULmN'S DIGEST, supra note 239, at 183-84.
'" The county court was permitted to take as legal evidence in such cases "the
confession of the offender, the oath of one or more credible witnesses, or such
testimony of negroes or mullattoes, bond or free, with pregnant circumstances, as
to them shall seem convincing." TOULMIN'S DIGEST, supra note 239, at 182 (Act of
1807 § 59).
' Ala. Const. of 1819, art. 6, Slaves § 2, in AKIKN's DIGEST supra note 102, at
391.
11 An Act to Amend the several Acts concerning the Trial of Slaves, passed
December 17, 1819 § 2, in ToULMIN'S DIGEST, supra note 239, at 185-86.
' State v. Abram, 4 Ala. 272, 275 (Ala. 1842).
21o AnKNi'S DIGEST, supra note 102, Criminal Law, Trial of Persons of Color §
69, at 125.
2" See AIKIN'S DIGEST, supra note 102, at 125.
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1841, reverting jurisdiction to the circuit courts and essentially
creating a three-tier system that governed until the Civil
War252
By and large, from 1841 to 1865, slaves in Alabama would
receive different trial procedures depending on the severity of
the offense. For any offense of a grade less than petit larceny,
slaves would be tried by a justice of the peace without a ju-
ry.2' For non-capital offenses greater than petit larceny,
slaves would receive a trial by petit jury in an inferior court
and in a summary fashion, without presentment or indictment
or counsel.' In capital cases, slaves had trial rights substan-
tially similar to those of white defendants.'
Second, slaveholders were guaranteed a certain number of
votes at the slave's trial. This too represented a process of
evolution in the law of slavery over the course of the early
nineteenth century. One of the first attempts to stack the jury
with slaveholders was in 1805 when the general assembly of
the Mississippi Territory passed an ordinance requiring that
the jury in felony or capital trials of slaves be composed of at
least two-thirds slave owners. 6 That provision was, of
course, nullified when slaves lost the right to jury trials in
1807. Then, by an Act of 1814, the general assembly condi-
2Z See, Abram, 4 Ala. at 273.
See, e.g., Ala. Code of 1852, § 3317 ("For the offence of petit larceny, or any
other offence of the same or less grade, any slave may be tried by a justice of the
peace ... but no justice is authorized to inflict more than thirty-ne stripe3,
unless he associates with him two respectable freeholders, who concur in the pro-
priety of the sentence.")
=" See, e.g., Ala. Code of 1852, §§ 3316-3327 (trial by the judge of the probate
court and two justices of the peace; no indictment or presentment; compulsory
process, but no other rights such as counsel).
• Thus, under the Alabama Code of 1852,
[t]he trial of all slaves for capital offences must, except in the cases
provided for by this chapter, be by the circuit court of the county having
jurisdiction, and in the mode provided by law for the trial of white per-
sons, except that the slave is allowed but twelve peremptory challenges,
and the state but four, and at least two-thirds of the jury must be
slaveholders.
Ala. Code of 1852, § 3319; see also Penal Code, ch. 15, Of Slaves and Free Ne-
groes, § 10, in CLAYS DIGEST, supra note 6, at 473.
Act of 1805 § 20, in AIKIN'S DIGEST, supra note 102, at Slamp, and Free
People of Color § 21, at 394-95. See also AlIGN'S DIGEST, supra note 102, Criminal
Law, Trial of Persons of Color § 67, 125 (by an Act of 1832, slaves were to be
tried in special tribunals in county court; the sheriff had to summon twenty-four
jurors, "one-half of whom shall be slaveholders").
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tioned certain punishments on consent from the slaveholder
community: "no slave shall be sentenced to receive more than
thirty-nine lashes, unless two respectable slaveholders to be
summoned by the justice for the purpose of trying said slave,
concur with him in the sentence."27 The Act of 1832, dis-
cussed earlier, required a petit jury "one-half of whom shall be
slaveholders."255  Eventually, the idea of a two-thirds
slaveholder majority gained foothold again and became well
entrenched.
Thus, the law in Alabama from the 1840s until the Civil
War required that the jury in the trial of a slave charged with
a capital offense consist of at least eight slaveholders.29
Moreover, those slaveholders that sat on juries were required
to have actual experience owning slaves. The mere possibility
of becoming a slaveholder was not adequate."' The legisla-
ture
meant that the pa[r]ty himself, or by his bailiff, should have pos-
session of a slave or slaves in which he had an interest. It is then he
is supposed to possess the sympathies and qualifications required by
the spirit of the enactment, and [is] prepared to sit as a juror upon a
trial involving the life of the slave."1
Third, slaveholders were competent witnesses at the trial
of their slaves--even though they were interested parties. The
Alabama Supreme Court did not address this issue until 1850,
but, in a classic example of "bricollage--drawing from the
laws of other states, the law of villeinage, and from "analogies
at the common law"--the court ruled that the master of a slave
was a competent witness for or against his slave.262 The court
concluded that "on grounds of public policy, of common human-
ity, of absolute necessity, the master must be held to be compe-
"' See An Act to amend 'An Act prescribing a Summary Mode for the Trial of
Slaves," passed January 15, 1814 § 1, in TOULMIN'S DIGEST, supra note 239, at
184; AIKIN'S DIGEST, supra note 102, Criminal Law, Trial of Persons of Color § 58,
at 123-24.
28 See Aui]N's DIGEST, supra note 102, Criminal Law, Trial of Persons of Color
§ 67, at 125.
28 Spence, a slave v. The State, 17 Ala. 192 (1850); see also Ala. Code of 1852
§ 3317 (same).
280 Spence, 17 Ala. at 192-94.
" Id. at 194 (second and third emphases added).
212 Id. at 196-97.
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tent either for or against his slave.' This too reflected the
interest of the slaveholders in controlling the trial process by,
literally, shaping the evidence at trial.
Fourth, the discretion of the slaveholder jurors was often
nonreviewable. In Alabama, certain statutes required the
speedy execution of slaves sentenced to death. These statutes
made it often impossible, as a practical matter, to perfect an
appeal before the execution. The Act of 1832 provided that "if
any slave or free person of color shall be found guilty of any
capital crime, there shall not be less than five nor more than
ten days, between the day of passing sentence and the day of
execution. ... " The Act of 1836 provided that the short
time frame could only be suspended where the trial court cer-
tified questions for appeal.'
One major exception to appellate review involved slaves
accused of insurrection. Throughout the nineteenth century
antebellum period, Alabama statutes uniformly provided an
exception "in cases of conspiracy, insurrection, or rebellion,
when the sentence [of death] of the court may be executed
forthwith." Thus, for example, the Act of 1852 provided
that "in case of a conviction for conspiracy, insurrection or
rebellion, the court... may sentence him to be executed forth-
with; and in such case the sentence must be executed accord-
ingly. &
7
In the area of appellate review, however, the trend during
the nineteenth century was toward more judicial review rather
than less-which undermined somewhat the ultimate discre-
tion of the slaveholder jurors. Whereas the appellate process
for slaves was severely limited during the early part of the
century, appellate procedure was reformed in the 1840s and
eventually allowed for greater review of slave convictions.
2' Id. at 194.
" Act of 1832 § 7, in AIKIS DIGEST, supra note 102, Criminal Law, Trial of
Persons of Color § 72, at 125-26; see also Penal Code, of Slaves and Free Nigme
§ 16, in CLAYS DIGEST, supra note 6, at 474 (execution to be done within 10 to
20 days of sentence).
" See John, a slave v. The State, 2 Ala. 290, 292 (1841).
" Act of 1832 § 7, in AIKIN'S DIGEST, supra note 102, Criminal Law, Trial of
Persons of Color § 72, at 126; see also Act of 1807 § 57 in TOULMIN'S DIGEST,
supra note 240, at 182; Act of 1819, § 2 in TOULIaN'S DIGEST, supra note 239, at
186.
' Ala. Code of 1852, § 3330.
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During the early years of statehood, from 1819 through
1822, slaves were tried in the inferior courts and, as a result,
could not appeal their convictions or death sentences to the
Alabama Supreme Court. The first reported decision of the
Supreme Court involving a slave appellant, Humphrey, a slave
v. The State,2  was in fact dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Humphrey had been convicted of burglary, a capital offense, in
the county court of "oyer and terminer" under legislation
passed in 1819 and 1821. Although the legislation allowed "an
appeal or writ of error... in the same manner as upon judg-
ments of the circuit courts,"2 9 the Alabama Supreme Court
ruled that it had no jurisdiction of a criminal case coming from
county court. The only way the appellate court could review a
criminal conviction was if a circuit court referred a question of
law as being novel and difficult." Thus, slaves like
Humphrey, convicted of capital offenses in county court, would
receive no appellate review. Slaves were tried in county court
from 1819 to December 1822, from 1832 to 1841 and, of course,
during the earlier territorial era.
Litigants in Alabama-both white and black"--had very
limited access to the appellate courts in criminal cases during
" 1 Minor 64 (Ala. 1822). The first term of the Alabama Supreme Court began
on the second Monday in May, 1820. See 1 Minor 1 (Ala. 1820). The first reported
decision of the Alabama Supreme Court involving a slave convicted of a criminal
offense was released two years later, in the June Term of 1822, and was entitled
Humphrey, a slave v. The State, 1 Minor 64 (Ala. 1822).
20. An act to repeal in part and amend an Act entitled "An Act to regulate the
proceedings in the courts of Law and Equity in this State," passed June 14, 1921,
§ 23, in TOULMIN'S DIGEST, supra note 239, at 199.
" The Court held in Humphrey, Minor at 65 that "[t]he Statutes of this State
have provided but one way in which a criminal case can come before this Court.
In cases of novelty and difficulty, the Circuit Court, after the rendition of final
judgment or sentence, can refer the question of Law to the Supreme Court."
"I Although the privilege of appeal was, as a technical matter, similarly re-
stricted for both whites and blacks, slaves received less process than white defen-
dents. Writs of error were very rarely bestowed on slaves. During the period from
1820 through 1835, at least 19 slaves were hung in execution of sentences im-
posed by courts. See List of Alabama executions prior to 1927, compiled by Watt
Espy of the Capital Punishment Research Project (on file with author). Yet during
that twelve year period, there are only four reported opinions involving slave ap-
pellants-including the Humphrey case where the Court declined jurisdiction. The
other cases are The State against Moses, 1 Minor 393 (Ala. 1825); The State v.
Phil, 1 Stewart 31 (Ala. 1827); and The State v. Peter, 1 Stewart 38 (Ala. 1827).
In contrast, during that period, there are thirty-two reported opinions involving
white defendants.
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the subsequent period, 1823 to 1843. The early cases involving
white defendants established that there was only one way to
obtain appellate review of a criminal conviction: to have the
circuit court render judgment and refer a matter of law as
"novel and difficult" 72 to the supreme court." Neverthe-
less, the appellate procedures were reformed during the 1840s
and eventually allowed for bills of exceptions on the
defendant's behalf. 4 Thus, during the period 1843 to 1865,
slave defendants had greater access to the appellate courts.
Most appellate decisions reflect that slaves were represented
=' See, e.g., The State v. Shelton, 3 Stewart 343, 344 (Ala. 1831) (court can
only hear issues referred as "novel and difficult' by the circuit court under Act of
December 1820); The State v. Cawood, 2 Stewart 360 (Ala. 1830); Collier v. The
State, 2 Stewart 388, 389 (Ala. 1830); The State v. Seay, 3 Stewart 123, 124 (Ala.
1830).
=' See The State against Reece, 1 MIfnor 266 (Ala. 1824). In Reece, the defen-
dant was charged in circuit court with stealing horses and receiving stolen proper-
ty. The Alabama Supreme Court held that it did not have jurisdiction over the
matter until final judgment was rendered by the circuit court and the circuit court
referred a matter as "novel and difficult" to the court. The opinion in The State v.
Shelton, 3 Stewart 343 (Ala. 1831) illustrates that the privilege of appeal belonged
to the circuit court and not the defendant. In Shelton, the parties tried to assign
errors in the record regarding matters that had not been referred by the circuit
court. The Alabama Supreme Court refused to hear these additional matters. The
court explained that "(tihis case has not reached this Court at the instance of the
defendant, but was sent here for the purpose of satisfying the presiding judge
below, that the conviction is legal; and the relationship of the parties upon the
record, is not changed by a reference of the cause." Id. at 344. Another severe
limitation on the appellate process was the fact that the matter referred had to be
"noveL" If a trial court ruling was clearly erroneous under well-settled precedent,
it would not qualify as "noveL" Cf. Ned, a slave v. The State, 7 Port. 187, 201
(Ala. June 1838) (court intimates that issue with precedent would not be novel).
Thus, there was no review for clearly erroneous, but ordinary rulings.
"I' Act of 1843 § 10, in CLAYS DIGEST, supra note 6, at 47L Prior to that, in
1841, the judges on the Alabama Supreme Court were granted the authority to
award a writ of error to bring up for review the proceedings in a criminal case.
However, the practice of the court remained to review only issues referred by the
circuit court. If there was an additional matter that the court wanted to review, it
would send the case back for a reference. As the court explained in The State v.
Abram, 4 Ala. 272, 275 (1842):
Anterior to the act of 1841, it was the settled practice of this Court,
never to reverse a judgment where a case was referred to us, unless the
error was shown by the points reserved. [The 1841 statute] it is con-
ceived does not effect such a change in the law as to warrant a depar-
ture from a practice coeval with the State government. If the record dis-
covers errors, which the order of reference does not bring to our view,
the correct course of procedure is, to ask for a writ of error, that they
may be adjudicated.
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by counsel on appeal, although there does not appear to be any
codified right to appellate counsel in the penal laws of that
period. 5
Accordingly, slaves acquired greater opportunities for judi-
cial review over in Alabama the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury. In this one respect, then, the evolution of slave law ran
counter to the predominant ideology of slave criminal proce-
dure. Naturally, there were other forces at play, including the
development of judicial review and, with it, the struggle be-
tween constitutional branches in the emerging state. But over-
all, the ideology of the criminal law in antebellum Alabama
placed discretion squarely in the hands of slaveholders. They
controlled the jury box, had access to the witness stand, and
determined not only guilt, but punishment, value and reim-
bursement. Through these mechanisms, slaveholders turned
the criminal law into an arm of the institution of chattel slav-
ery.
B. Methodological Interlude
It is impossible to discuss the ideology of slave criminal
law without mentioning methodology. The study of American
slavery is, today, a contentious enterprise because of the nu-
merous methodological approaches that have been applied
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries." Scholars
have approached the field from a number of different angles,
including judicial idiosyncracy theories that explain inconsis-
tencies in the laws of slavery by recourse to the varying per-
sonalities, backgrounds and demographic traits of southern
judges;277 functional approaches that interpret change in the
26 Slaves were afforded legal counsel at trial. See supra note 239.
'8 See, e.g., Fede, supra note 238, at 99; Fisher supra note 22, at 1056.57;
Schiller, supra note 22.
7 This method-called 'judicial idiosyncracy" theory (Fisher, supra note 22, at
1057 n.34) or "judicial personality theory" (Schiller, supra note 22, at
1212)-attempts to explain the inconsistencies of slave law by developing "a link
between behavior on the bench and a number of social and political characteristics
of the judges." Nash, supra note 22, at 93. The works of AE. Keir Nash and
David J. Langum illustrate this approach. See A.E. Keir Nash, Reason of Slavery:
Understanding the Judicial Role in the Peculiar Institution, 32 VAND. L. REV. 7
(1979); AE. Keir Nash, The Texas Supreme Court and the Trial Rights of Blacks,
1845-1860, 58 J. AM. HIST. 622 (1971); AE. Keir Nash, A More Equitable Past?
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law of slavery in light of the interests of the slaveowner
class;" scientific Marxist and hegemonic theories that de-
Southern Supreme Courts and the Protection of the Antebellum Negro, 48 N.C. L.
REV. 197 (1970); A.E. Keir Nash, Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness on the
South Carolina Court of Appeals: The Extraordinary Chief Justice John Belton
O'eall, 21 S.C. L. REV. 141 (1969); David J. Langum, The Role of Intellect and
Fortuity in Legal Change: An Incident from the Law of Slavery, 28 AM. J. LEGAL
HisT. 1 (1984). Nash believed that the appellate courts of the Deep South demon-
strated "an overlooked antebellum tradition of solicitude for the black defendant."
Nash, supra note 22, at 65. Nash attempted to document the favorable treatment
bestowed on blacks by a statistical analysis regarding the rates of reversal in
criminal opinions. Nash surveys the reversal rates from the appellate courts of
eight Southern states between 1830 and 1860 and concludes that the rate of re-
versal for black defendants was substantially higher than for white defendants
convicted of inflicting injuries on blacks. Nash, supra note 22, at 77. Wle prose-
cutions of blacks were numerous-there were 238 appeals taken during this peri-
od-defendants secured reversals in 136 instances. Thus, blacks won reversals in
more than half the cases that reached the appellate levelV Nash, cupra note 22,
at 79. In order to explain disparities and differences in treatment, Nash focused
on the social and political characteristics of the judges, including age, socio-eco-
nomic status, dates of appointment, place of birth, education, and party ailiation.
Nash concluded that conservative and centrist judges 'came in greater numbers
from Upper and Upper Middle family environments" and had more education than
did the more liberal judges. Nash, supra note 22, at 95 and 96.
11 Scholars such as A. Leon Higginbotham and Andrew Fede propose a method-
ology that explains the evolution of legal doctrine in terms of the domination of
the white masters over their black slaves. Under this method,
inconsistencies and contradictions are only apparent; careful analysis will
show that all aspects of slave law were shrewdly designed to serve the
interests of slave owners-specifically, to enable masters to extract as
much labor as possible from their slaves, to enhance masters' ability to
discipline their slaves, and to protect masters' property interests in their
slaves.
Fisher, supra note 22, at 1056. Thus, in an article on the slave criminal laws of
Virginia, Higginbotham exposes how Virginia's colonial and antebellum criminal
justice system helped maintain blacks' powerlessness and submissiveness in order
to ensure the dominance of the master and perpetuate slavery. Higginbotham &
Jacobs, supra note 95, at 1067-68. Similarly, the legal historian Andrew Feda
maintains that the law of slavery was molded to further the interests of the white
slaveholders: "The logic of slave law is ... consistent and rational and presents
no dilemma at all; it was the process of stripping slaves of their legal rights (de-
fining them as property) and burdening them with special legal duties (calling
them 'people').? Andrew Fede, Toward a Solution of the Slave Law Dilemma: A
Critique of Tushnees The American Law of Slavery, 2 LAW & HIST. RE V. 301, 314
(1984). In his article, Fede focuses on the ever-changing laws regarding crimes
against black slaves, in particular violent white abuse of black slaves, in six
southern states. Fede demonstrates how the "liberalizing" trend in the law-for in-
stance, the trend toward criminal sanctions against overseers for excessive punish-
ment of submissive slaves-was nothing more than a shifting accommodation of
the white slave-holding class. Criminal penalties were imposed because the mas-
ters and the lawmakers came to the conclusion that the civil remedies against
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scribe the evolution of the law of slavery in terms of the funda-
mental tension between plantation-based modes of production
and the growth of commercial capitalism;" 9 and structuralist
approaches that identify the numerous antecedents of Ameri-
can slave law in the laws and customs of foreign jurisdic-
tions." ° As a result of these varying methodologies, the ante-
overseers were inadequate. "[Tihe scope of legalized white slave mistreatment was
limited when, and only to the extent that, it conflicted with the interests of other
whites that the southern lawmakers perceived to be of superior import, and there.
fore deserving the law's protection." Fede, supra note 238, at 150.
" This method-called "scientific Marxism," Fisher, supra note 22, at 1057
n.34-relies on Marxist legal analysis and is illustrated by the work of MARK
TUSHNEP, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF IUMAN-
ITY & INTEREST (1981), and, to a lesser extent, Eugene Genovese & Elizabeth Fox-
Genovese, Slavery, Economic Development and the Law: The Dilemma of the
Southern Political Economists, 1800-1860, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1984).
Tushnet describes in the antebellum period a number of dichotomies and argues
that these dichotomies are reflected in the law of slavery. Slave owners belonged
to a mature bourgeois society that treated workers purely as producers; however,
slave owners also belonged to a slave society that inevitably dealt with all aspects
of the slaves' lives. This principal dichotomy is reflected in the law of slavery: the
law regulated commercial dealings (law), whereas unwritten practices associated
with the master's codes controlled the lives of the slaves (sentiment). TUSHNET,
supra, ch. 1; see, e.g., TUSHNET, supra, at 62. Genovese & Fox-Genovese describe
the "bifurcation of southern law, as if to render the economy unto Caesar and
social relations unto God." Genovese & Fox-Genovese, supra, at 2. They conclude
that "the relation between southern political economy and southern law rests upon
the judgment that, ultimately, the dominant social relations of southern slave
society blocked the development of southern political economy, while compelling
the bifurcation of southern law identified by Mark Tushnet." Genovese & Fox-
Genovese, supra at 3.
"0 This method relies on the theory of metaphor developed by Claude Levi-
Strauss, and argues that southern judges were not crafting new doctrines from
scratch, but instead piecing together the law of slavery from the bits and pieces of
past legal orders. Scholars such as Alan Watson, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAS
(1989), Slave Law: History and Ideology, 91 YALE L. J. 1034 (1982), and Arnold
Sio, Interpretations of Slavery: The Slave Status in the Americas, 7 COMP. STUD. IN
Soc'Y & HIST. 289 (1965),
proceed[ ] on the assumption that the bulk of all legal systems is bor-
rowed from the laws of other jurisdictions; to explain the American law
of slavery, consequently, one must identify the ingredients from which it
was made-a dash of villenage, a splash of Roman law (strained through
the civil law tradition), a sizable dollop from the slave code of Barbados,
and a large portion of the common law and equitable principles in force
in England.
Fisher, supra note 22, at 1056. There are ample illustrations of "recollage" and
"bricolage" in the slave criminal law of Alabama. The appellate courts of Alabama
relied heavily on the English law of villenage and the common law of England to
resolve criminal law issues regarding slaves. See, e.g., Spence, a slave v. State, 17
Ala. 192, 196 (1850); Ned, a slave v. State, 7 Port. 187, 202-17 (Ala. 1838) (relying
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bellum law of slavery has been described, at one extreme, as
exhibiting an "apparent libertarianism,"2' and, at another,
as "designed to keep blacks as powerless and submissive as
possible. 1
2
Most recently, scholars have proposed to enrich these
various methodologies with a cultural and contextual approach
that focuses on the ideas, morals, justifications, religious be-
liefs and images held by Southerners--an approach heavily
influenced by the discussion of symbols and ideologies in the
work of Clifford Geertz. One such scholar, Terry Fisher,
suggests that the way white Southerners defined and justified
themselves and their society "affected the rhetoric and content
of the law of slavery."' After meticulously reviewing the lit-
erature, media, narratives, and traditions of the antebellum
South, Fisher concludes that "the content of southern antebel-
lum ideology helps account for the remarkable degree of incon-
sistency and instability in the law of slavery.... [WIhite
Southerners were ambivalent or divided. Those divisions and
uncertainties fostered corresponding divisions and uncertain-
ties in legal doctrine." 6 Another scholar, Reuel Schiller, sim-
ilarly focuses on "community standards," and suggests that
these standards determined the bounds of judicial
decisionmaking. According to Schiller, "The various assump-
tions North Carolinians had about slavery (e.g., slaves are
prone to rebellion or slaves have the mental capacities of chil-
dren and must be treated as such) and law (e.g., it is impartial
or it follows precedent) provided the context in which judicial
decisions were handed down."'
This Article advances an interpretation of the criminal
on Roman law, English law (including Lord Coke, Blackstone, and Lord Halo), and
decisions from New York, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina).
1 Nash, supra note 22, at 66.
Higginbotham & Jacobs, supra note 95, at 1067-68.
Fisher, supra note 22, Schiller, supra note 22, at 1219.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text
Fisher, supra note 22, at 1057. Fisher traces some of the roots of his math-
od to the works of non-legal historians, such as JOHN BIASSINGAME, THE SLAVE
COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELUM SOUTH (1972), GEORGE
FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-
AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY (1971), and EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JOR-
DAN, ROLI: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1974).
Fisher, supra note 22, at 1081.
"s Schiller, supra note 22, at 1219.
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laws of slavery that is influenced both by this cultural-contex-
tual approach and by what may be called refined
functionalism. As discussed more fully in Part IV, this inter-
pretation shares Geertz's sensibility about the role of images
and symbols in the shaping of ideas. At the same time, it also
borrows from the functional approach a sensitivity to the po-
litical design of criminal laws; however, instead of focusing on
powerlessness, it focuses on the allocation of discretion in the
criminal process and thereby refines the analysis to accommo-
date conflicting interests-in particular the conflicting and
ambiguous relationship between slaveholders and the criminal
justice system. This methodological approach will also prove
helpful in comparing the ideologies of the Warren and
Rehnquist Courts.
C. The Warren and Rehnquist Courts
Like the decisions of the southern antebellum courts, the
criminal law opinions of the Warren Court project a consistent,
identifiable, and distinct ideology of criminal law. The court's
mission was to even the scales of justice in favor of the unedu-
cated, the impoverished and the unknowing defendant. The
landmark decisions provide counsel to the poor,2 warnings
to the unknowings 9 safeguards for the young,2 90  and
(some) protections for African-Americans. 1 Beginning in
1954 with the case of Hernandez v. Texas, 92 the Warren
Court attempted to redress racial and ethnic inequities in jury
service." "As Charles Ogletree has suggested, much of the
Warren Court's 'criminal procedure' reform more properly
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
29 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
" Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
22 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (systematic exclusion of persons of Mexican descent from
service as jury commissioners, grand jurors, and petit jurors violates equal protec-
tion clause).
" See, e.g., Swain, 380 U.S. at 224 (1965) (recognizing a cause of action for
pervasive discriminatory jury strikes by the prosecutor); Arnold v. North Carolina,
376 U.S. 773 (1964) (murder convictions reversed for systematic exclusion of blacks
from grand jury which returned indictments); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584
(1958) (murder conviction reversed for systematic exclusion of blacks from grand
jury, where only one Negro had served accidentally on grand jury within memory
in the Parish of Orleans).
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should be understood as constituting a branch of race law.'
In landmark cases like Griffin v. Illinois, Gideon v. Wain-
wright, and Douglas v. California, the Warren Court attempted
to redress discrimination against the poor. 5 Throughout, the
Warren Court "read into the Constitution a philosophy of level-
In contrast, the landmark decisions of the Rehnquist Court
even the scales in favor of the victim, by allowing victim-im-
pact evidence in a capital sentencing trial; in favor of the
state's witness, by allowing testimony by closed-circuit televi-
sion for child victims of sexual assault;" in favor of the po-
lice officer and the public, by allowing a public-safety exception
to Miranda;9 and in favor of the state, by restricting the
federal writ of habeas corpus."0 The Rehnquist Court has
"' Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the
Critical Tools of the Siies, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2231, 2245 (1993) (citing Charles
Ogletree, Lecture at the American Association of Law Schools Annual M4eating
(Jan. 1990)).
=" "While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his poverty,
they have the obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration
of justice." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966) (referring in footnote 41
to the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administra-
tion of Federal Criminal Justice 9 (1963)). See, eg., Williams v. Ilinois, 399 Us.
235 (1970) (indigent defendant cannot be subjected to extra incarceration beyond
statutory maximum solely by reason of indigence); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S.
40 (1967) (indigent defendant entitled to transcript of preliminary hearing); Draper
v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (indigent defendant has right to transcript or
sufficient record of trial proceedings on first state appeal as of right); Lane v.
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (indigent defendant has right to transcript on appeal
from state writ of error coram nobis); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(indigent defendant has right to appellate counsel on first state appeal as of
right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent defendant has right to
counsel in state court); Griffn v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indigent defendant
has right to transcript or sufficient record of trial proceedings on first state appeal
as of right).
"' Douglas, 372 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
17 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
M" aryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
" New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
= See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (restricting availability of
writ on successive petition); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (restricting
availability of writ where counsel erred in state post conviction proceedings);
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (restricting right to evidentiary hear-
ing on petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288 (1989) (restricting retroactive applicability of new rules of law). See gen-
erally Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV. 303, 303-
05 (1993) (discussing and cataloguing the recent decisions narrowing the reach of
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limited and restricted many of the equalizing principles of the
Warren Court. It has consistently refused to extend protections
for indigent defendants, and has, in certain areas, limited their
access to the courts.01 As Charles Ogletree writes:
Although the Rehnquist Court has yet to overrule the cornerstone
Warren Court precedents-Miranda v. Arizona, Gideon v. Wain.
wright, and Mapp v. Ohio-the extension of the harmless error anal-
ysis to constitutional errors in the landmark case of Chapman fv.
California] has allowed the Court to dilute the practical effect of
many of these important protections."
All in all, the decisions of the Rehnquist Court reflect the
"growing sentiment that too much emphasis is placed on the
'rights' of criminals, and that victims, and law abiding citizens,
have few rights."3 3 In an interview with the New York Times
in 1985, Justice Rehnquist admitted these sentiments:
I came to the court sensing, without really having followed it terri-
bly closely, that there were some excesses in terms of constitutional
adjudication during the era of the so-called Warren Court... And I
felt that I probably would disagree with some of those decisions....
So I felt that at the time I came on the Court, the boat was kind of
heeling over in one direction. Interpreting my oath as I saw it, I felt
that my job was, where those sort of situations arose, to kind of lean
the other way.3
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that "[iun the area of consti-
tutional rights of accused criminal defendants, the Court has
called a halt to a number of the sweeping rulings that were
made in the days of the Warren Court." 5 Overall, the
the writ of habeas corpus, in the context of arguing that the consistent thread
throughout habeas corpus jurisprudence has been a federal common law approach
of equitable discretion).
... See, e.g., Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992) (district court may pierce
the veil of the complaint's factual allegations in an in forma pauperis complaint
and dismiss the complaint where the facts appear fanciful); Pennsylvania v. Finley,
481 U.S. 551 (1987) (right to appointed counsel does not extend to indigent defen-
dant challenging her conviction in state post-conviction proceedings); Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (right to appointed counsel does not extend to indi-
gent defendant on his discretionary appeal to the state supreme court).
"' Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying
Harmless Error To Coerced Confessions, 105 HARv. L. REv. 152, 157-58 (1991).
Id. at 171.
14 John A. Jenkins, The Partisan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1985 (magazine), avail-
able in LEXIS, Allnews Library, NYT file.
30 Id. at *9 (quoting Justice Rehnquist).
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Rehnquist Court has made the criminal justice system more
responsive to the needs of victims, police, and states. Its re-
frain has been that 'justice, though due to the accused, is due
to the accuser also... We are to keep the balance true." 5
Scholars have offered a number of different ways to ex-
plain the shift in ideology from the Warren Court to the
Rehnquist Court. This Article will explore three of these ap-
proaches, as informed by the methodological discussion from
the slavery context.
The first approach to the modern cases-what might be
called raw functionalism-contrasts the ideologies along the
defendant-state axis. Whereas the opinions of the Warren
Court are often described as "pro-defendant," the opinions of
the Rehnquist Court can be characterized as "pro-state" or
"anti-defendant." Craig Bradley, a professor and former law
clerk ' of Rehnquist, describes the Chief Justice as "unques-
tionably the most conservative member of the Court, that is,
the most likely to vote against a criminal defendant ....
Erwin Chemerinsky argues that the Rehnquist Court consis-
tently "accepts and endorses conservative views" and "nar-
row[s] the rights of criminal defendants."' David Shapiro
suggests that a basic proposition guiding Rehnquist is that
"[conflicts between an individual and the government should,
whenever possible, be resolved against the individual."' 0
Charles Ogletree contends that, for Rehnquist, "the judicial
imperative is to 'lock criminals up."'31
These characterizations, though caustic, do reflect the
voting patterns of the Rehnquist Court. In the 1988 term, for
instance, the Rehnquist Court "sided with the government in
" Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quoting Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (Cardozo, J.)).
"' Craig Bradley testified on behalf of Justice Rehnquist at the Senate Judicia-
ry Hearings on the Nomination of William Relnquist to be Chief Justice of the
United States (July 31, 1986). See Nomination of William Rehnquist as Chief Jus-
tice of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 2d sess. (1986); Bradley, supra note 23, at 273 n.*.
'" Bradley, supra note 23, at 274 (emphasis added).
m' Erwin Chemerinshy, Is the Rehnquist Court Really that Concervative?.: An
Analysis of the 1991-92 Term, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 987 (1993).
30 David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist. A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 293, 294 (1976).
Ou Ogletree, supra note 302, at 173.
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twenty-seven out of thirty-five criminal procedure cases.""
In nonunanimous criminal cases from 1985 to 1992, Rehnquist
voted against the individual (criminal defendant or prisoner)
ninety-one percent of the time; Scalia eighty-six percent of the
time; and Kennedy, O'Connor and Thomas, seventy-eight,
seventy-eight and seventy-five percent of the time, respective-
ly."' In this sense, the numbers support the first approach;
nevertheless, it seems overly simplistic. It is hard to believe
that criminal defendants are going to be denied relief simply
because they are criminal defendants. By focusing on the pow-
erless-rather than on the allocation of discretion-this ap-
proach lacks the refinement necessary to explain the cases
where the defendant prevails.
A second approach compares the competing ideologies from
the perspective of an intentionalist versus determinist account
of human conduct." 4 Intentionalism describes human conduct
as the product of free will and autonomous choice. 5 Deter-
minism describes human conduct as causally related to ante-
cedent factors, such as education, environment, or culture. 16
Mark Keiman suggests that these two competing accounts of
human nature represent "conscious interpretive constructs"
that "function as unreasoned presuppositions that solve cases
while obscuring the dissonant, fundamentally nondeductive
nature of legal discourse."31
" Jennifer L. Hurley, Has the Supreme Court "Wrench[ed] the Sixth Amend-
ment From its Proper Context?" 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 967, 988 n.232 (1993) (citing
Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Introduction-The Rehnquist Court, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 521,
550 (1991)); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988
Term-Forward: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 57 (1989).
"' Christopher E. Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia and Criminal Justice Cases, 81
KY. L.J. 187, 193 (1992-93).
"' See Kelman, supra note 16, at 596-97; MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 86 (1987) (hereinafter "KELMAN, CLS GUIDE"); Richard C. Boldt,
The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2245,
2246 (1992); Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091
(1985); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility, 49 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1986).
"' See Kelman, supra note 16, at 597; KELMAN, CLS GUIDE, supra note 314, at
86; Boldt, supra note 314, at 2246.
316 See Kelman, supra note 16, at 597; KELMAN, CLS GUIDE, supra note 314, at
86; Boldt, supra note 314, at 2246 & n.1.
"' Kelman, supra note 16, at 597. Kelman also suggests that there is little
consistency in the adoption of either framework, and that the intentionalist model
generally holds sway in the criminal law. See Kelman, supra note 16, at 598
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The criminal law ideology of the Warren Court is located
more on the determinist side. Although the court does not go
so far as to deny criminal culpability because of "harsh back-
ground circumstances"' 1 --and therefore does not carve out a
full deterministic excuse' 9--the court does take account of
background circumstances such as poverty and lack of educa-
tion, and attempts to compensate for those circumstances
through criminal justice. In contrast, the ideology of the
Rehnquist Court places its emphasis on individual responsi-
bility and free choice-what could be characterized as
intentionalism. Whereas the opinions of the Warren Court
focus on the environmental factors that render the criminal
defendant vulnerable to committing crimes, the opinions of the
Rehnquist Court treat the criminal defendant's act in isolation,
as the product of his free will.' The Rehnquist Court does
not appear interested in understanding crime in a way that
would reduce the defendant's freedom of choice. The role of the
criminal justice system is, instead, to "keep the balance true"
and vindicate the rights of the victim and society.
The shift from a determinist to an intentionalist outlook
also provides a good fit with the images of criminal defendants
described in Part IE. The image of the vulnerable, impression-
able, uneducated defendant corresponds well to the ideology of
leveling, equalizing and educating. Similarly, the image of the
("[m]ost basic issues of the criminal law are issues of the applicability of an
intentionalist model"); see also Boldt, supra note 314, at 2247 (*(tlhe thesis of this
article is that the criminal law-indeed, the legal system generally-does more
than simply express an intentionalist perspective. Rather, it is a vital societal
mechanism by which that perspective is created and maintained, and the causal or
objective perspective obscured"). This Article takes a slightly different view of the
matter.
" Kelman, supra note 16, at 645.
"' This would be the extreme position: that harsh background circumstances
are an excuse to criminal liability. This issue was debated between David L.
Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL L. REV. 385 (1976) and
Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon,
49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247 (1976); see also Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Back-
ground": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental
Deprivation?, 3 L. & INEQ. J. 9 (1985).
11 Though this outlook is called "intentionalist" here, it alo produces a sort of
determinism in the sense that the criminal defendant becomes his criminal act
and therefore becomes, in his essence or genetically, 'just plain mean." This single-
minded focus on the criminal act ultimately deprives the defendant of arguing for
his reduced culpability.
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cold-blooded, recidivist, unredeeming defendant corresponds
well to the ideology of limited federal review of state convic-
tions. This approach has the additional advantage of incorpo-
rating the prior comparative approach. It accounts for the pro-
defendant/pro-state dichotomy. Nevertheless, it too has short-
comings, due, again, to its emphasis on the criminal defendant.
It fails to explain decisions that address the legitimate scope of
law enforcement and the proper allocation of power between
state and federal courts.
Peter Arenella proposes a third approach.32 Arenella of-
fers, in essence, a reconstructed version of Herbert Packer's
crime control and due process models3" as a way to isolate
the distinctive characteristics of the criminal law. Arenella
suggests that ideologies of criminal procedure necessarily pro-
mote general functions, such as truth-discovery, efficiency,
finality and the protection of individual rights. According to
Arenella, however, these general functions do not provide help-
ful ways of defining or comparing the ideologies."2o Instead, a
more focused conception of the functions served by the criminal
"' Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren
and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 212 (1983).
.22 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968)
(hereinafter "LIMITS"); Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964); see also Ogletree, supra note 802, at 172 n.122. The two
models can be summarized as follows. The crime control model places its emphasis
on the swift resolution of criminal cases by administrative techniques (plea bar-
gaining with police investigators that have cracked the case) in order to promote
law and order. PACKER, LIrTS, supra at 160-65. The due process model relies on
the adjudicatory process (trial in the adversarial paradigm) in order to best pro-
mote the respect and dignity of the individual and of the criminal process. PACK-
ER, LIMBTS, supra at 165-68. See also Arenella, supra note 321, at 210-11.
' Arenella, supra note 321, at 186-88. According to Arenella, the "tired cliches
like truth-discovery, crime control, and the protection of individual rights" create a
"shallow" debate that "fails to illuminate fundamentally different approaches to the
criminal process." Arenella, supra note 321, at 186, 187. From the perspective of
these "tired cliches," the Burger and Warren Courts do not look that different. In
part, this is because there is "no pure 'guilt or innocence' model of American crim.
inal procedure. Constitutional criminal procedure serves other goals--efficient allo.
cation of scare resources, power allocation, and the protection of fair process
norms-that may impair its function of reliably determining substantive guilt."
Arenella, supra note 321, at 208. In the case of the Warren and Burger Courts,
these "tired cliches" mask two very different ideologies of criminal procedure. "The
academic consensus about the Burger Court ignores or minimizes the degree to
which the Court's rhetoric and doctrine reflect a vision of criminal laws goals and
procedural functions that differs significantly from that espoused by the Warren
Court." Arenella, supra note 321, at 187.
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process, and an analysis of how these functions are pursued,
provide a better way to understand competing ideologies.
Arenella provides this concrete statement of the specific
functions of American criminal procedure:
First, criminal procedure must provide a process that vindicates
substantive criminal law goals. This procedural mechanism must de-
termine substantive guilt' reliably, authoritatively, and in a man-
ner that promotes the criminal laws sentencing objectives. Second,
criminal procedure must provide a dispute resolution mechanism
that allocates scarce resources efficiently and that distributes power
among state officials. Finally, criminal procedure can perform a
legitimation function by resolving state-citizen disputes in a manner
that commands the community's respect for the fairness of its pro-
cesses as well as the reliability of its outcomes ... by articulating
fair process norms that attempt to validate the state's exercise of
coercive power over its citizens."'
The opinions of the Warren Court pursue the first function
through a commitment to trial adjudication-even though this
"was tempered by its concern about an overburdened criminal
justice system.""6 The decisions pursue the second function
by constitutionalizing many aspects of criminal procedure and
by judicially regulating law enforcement conduct.' Finally,
the Warren Court opinions promote the third function "by
using, when possible, rules rather than standards to define the
content of fair process norms and the circumstances under
which they can be waived.' In addition, the Court took ex-
pansive views of its supervisory authority over the federal
courts and of its jurisdiction under habeas corpus to resolve
claims denied in state courts. Overall, the courtes willing-
ness to remedy violations of fair process norms by excluding
evidence that would have been probative as to factual guilt,
reflects the view that the criminal process was equally impor-
'' "Substantive guilt" is not merely factual guilt; it includes a moral component
or "value judgments about the actor's moral culpability." Arenella, oupra note 321,
at 198. Because of the moral component, "substantive guilt" cannot be equated
with "truth-discovery." This moral component is precisely what Gary Peller claims
has not been deconstructed by a realist critique and results in the Warren Court's
emphasis on process over substance. Peller, supra note 294, at 2239.
" Arenella, supra note 321, at 188.
2 Arenella, supra note 321, at 229.
Arenella, supra note 321, at 231.
Arenella, supra note 321, at 240.
Arenella, supra note 321, at 240.
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tant to the outcome of the criminal trial. ° "Perhaps the
Warren Court's most significant message about criminal
procedure's functions lay in its attempts to reinforce the notion
that the criminal process should treat individuals with dignity
and respect even if such treatment occasionally impairs the
accuracy of the system's outcomes."33'
The Rehnquist Court has pursued the functions of criminal
procedure differently. In particular, the Rehnquist Court "ex-
presses a basic faith in the decentralized exercise of power by
criminal justice officials. "1 2 The Rehnquist Court "trusts ex-
ecutive power and seeks to deregulate it."' In addition, the
Rehnquist Court has pursued fair process norms that relate to
the legitimizing function of the criminal courts by 'limiting
opportunities for judicial implementation of norms that impair
the state's capacity to detect and punish factually guilty of-
fenders,"M particularly by restricting the writ of habeas cor-
pus in cases involving state criminal convictions.' The
Rehnquist Court, more so even than the Burger Court, reflects
a number of themes from Arenella's reconstructed crime con-
trol model:
judicial deregulation of state and federal criminal justice officials,
hostility to fair process norms that impair the state's capacity to
detect and punish the factually guilty, and a pronounced tendency to
view individual rights from a utilitarian perspective that defines
their content in light of their functional impact on the system's ca-
pacity to promote social control.3"
In contrast to the prior methods, this approach explains
30 Arenella, supra note 321, at 247. This reflects a clear articulation of the
reconstructed due process model.
Areneila, supra note 321, at 247.
Arenela, supra note 321, at 223.
Arenella, supra note 321, at 233. Yale Kamisar, for instance, described then-
Justice Rehnquist as "willing and eager to dismantle the work of the Warren
Court in the search and seizure area." See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was
It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Was It Really So Prosecution-
Oriented) and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION THAT WASN'r 62, 81 (V. Blasi ed., 1983).
' Arenella, supra note 321, at 241.
336 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 313, at 205-06 (discussing Scalia's efforts to curb
filings by death row inmates by declaring that "he would not give extensions for
the filing deadlines, even for prisoners who lacked professional assistance and thus
were forced to represent themselves in seeking Supreme Court review").
36 Arenella, supra note 321, at 247.
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the criminal law decisions that address police powers, as well
as the allocation of power between state and federal courts. It
has greater depth because it focuses not only on the criminal
defendant, but on the allocation of discretion in the criminal
justice system. Thus, the Warren Court's efforts to
constitutionalize rules of criminal procedure reflect the court's
inherent distrust of executive power (police and
prosecutor), which is well illustrated by its imagery of po-
lice officers. Similarly, the Warren Courts overriding concerns
for the integrity of the criminal process-which reinforces the
notion that defendants should be treated with dignity and re-
spect-reflect the court's inclusive image of the defendant as
citizen. The Rehnquist Court's decentralization and trust of
executive power mirrors its image of the police officer as trust-
worthy and its repeated theme that the courts should not im-
pose additional duties on an already overly burdened po-
lice.' In this way, Arenella's approach highlights the funda-
mental shift in the ideologies of the Warren and Rehnquist
Courts by focusing on the allocation of discretion within the
criminal justice system.
IV. THE IMPACT OF IMAGERY AND IDEOLOGY ON THE
ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS IN THE CRMiNAL LAW
With these structures in place, it is possible to critically
explore the relationship between imagery and ideology in the
criminal law. The thesis of this Article is that images and
ideologies relate in a dynamic way that produces centrifugal
force in the adjudicative process: ideologies sharpen images,
and images sharpen ideologies, in a cyclical manner that cre-
ates distance in the resolution of criminal cases. This dynamic
process includes several movements and this part of the Article
will explore each of these movements separately.
"s Arenella, supra note 321, at 223, 23L
See also Smith, supra note 313, at 193 (C[tlhe reduction of the scope of con-
stitutional protections for criminal defendants and prisoners . . . is attributable to
both the conservative philosophical orientations of recent Supreme Court appoint-
ees and increased skepticism among the justices about the continued risks of mis-
behavior by criminal justice officials"); see also Christopher E. Smith, Police Profes-
sionalism and the Rights of Criminal Defendants, 26 CIM. L. BULL 155 (1990).
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A. The Antebellum Period
No one disputes that ideologies shape images. This is dem-
onstrated well in the earlier discussion of the imagery in slave
law. 9 What is more intriguing is how images shape ideolo-
gies. The case of Spence, a slave v. The State"0 provides a
powerful illustration. Spence was charged with murder. At his
trial, a jury was empaneled and included, as one of the eight
slaveholder jurors, a fellow named Scurlock. During jury selec-
tion, Scurlock explained that he did not own any slaves at the
time of trial, but that he was likely to inherit slaves in the
very near future because his father had passed away and the
estate, which included slaves, was under administration. "
The trial court accepted Scurlock as a slaveholder juror, but
certified the question for the appellate court. Spence was con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death.
The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Spence's conviction,
holding that Scurlock was not a competent juror. He did not
own slaves and there was a possibility he might not inherit
any from his father's estate. He "expected upon ... the distri-
bution of his father's estate.., to become a slaveholder. But
before that time they might die; they might be sold for the
purpose of a more equitable distribution; many circumstances
might occur which would prevent either the legal title or the
possession ever vesting." 2 According to the court, the law
required more than a mere property qualification.
Why the fuss? Because of the lurking threat that an obedi-
ent and faithful slave might in fact reveal himself to be a trai-
tor. This made it necessary to entrust the delicate task to actu-
al slaveholders. Only they were familiar with the idiosyncra-
cies of slaves. Only they were, in the words of the court, '!per-
sons supposed to be familiar with this species of property, to
have obtained a knowledge of their peculiarities and idiosyn-
cracies from personal observation."3 Slaveholders were need-
" See supra text accompanying notes 94-132 (discussing how fundamental ten-
sions in the law of slavery affected the imagery of slave criminal defendants).
"' 17 Ala. 192 (1850).
Id.
342 Id.
3,3 Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
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ed on the jury because they alone could discern the obedient,
redeemable slave from the rebellious traitor.3"
In this sense, the image of the chameleon slave became
the available mental image from which the court formed an
opinion about Scurlock's competence as a juror. This mental
image became the basis of a facile heuristic device: slaves are
peculiar and idiosyncratic and only slaveholders can really tell
them apart. In the same way, the schizophrenic image of the
slave as property empowered the slaveholder in the criminal
justice system. Through that image, slaveholders gained con-
trol of the jury box, set fair market values and assigned the
portion of the slave's value to be reimbursed to the owner."
B. The Warren Court
The next step is to explore how this dynamic relationship
between imagery and ideology creates centrifugal force in the
judicial process. The opinions in Haynes v. Washington"' il-
lustrate this well. Robert L. Haynes was accused of robbery
and caught red-handed. When the police stopped to pick him
up, he told them they had the right man. The police detained
Haynes incommunicado for about sixteen hours, and repeat-
edly denied his requests to call his wife and an attorney-after
which he signed a written confession."' By the time the War-
ren Court decided Haynes in 1963, the court had developed a
substantial body of law governing confessions. On the facts of
I' It is interesting to note that A.E. Keir Nash relies on the Spence care in
support of the proposition that southern appellate judges ensured unbiased judges
and juries. See Nash, supra note 22, at 81 and n.77. This underscores some of the
flaws of Nash's statistical analysis, which fails to take into account that many
reversals were entirely unrelated to the rights of the black defendant. Nash attrib-
utes to the appellate judges pro-slave leanings when in fact the decisions served
only to perpetuate the system of chattel slavery.
" This, in turn, legitimized punishment in the eyes of the slaveholding society.
Newspaper accounts emphasized the participation of the slaveholder community in
the trial process, as evidenced by the following newspaper report- "In November,
1843, Nancy, a slave of Parker Beasley was convicted of assault to kill Mary
Beasley. Nancy, tried by a jury made up of 2/3's slaveholdera, was sentenced to
hang." The record of the trial also explicitly reflected that two-thirds of the jurors
were slaveholders. See Nancy, a slave v. The State, 6 Ala. 483 (1844). On Jan. 27,
1845, the Alabama Legislature appropriated to Parker S. Beasley $250 for a slave
woman executed in Montgomery County in March 1844. Act of Ala. Vol 31, at 173.
373 U.S. 503 (1963).
u Id. at 504.
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his case, Haynes had a strong claim of coercion. The lengthy
incommunicado detention, coupled with unfulfilled promises
that he could call his wife, were damning. A majority of the
court ruled for Haynes in an opinion, written by Justice
Goldberg, that focused on the police misconduct and its impact
on the rule of law.
Justice Clark, in an impassioned dissent, focused the read-
er instead on the image of the defendant. Clark essentially
argued that Haynes did not fit the image. Haynes was "a ma-
ture adult," "neither youthful in age.., nor lacking in experi-
ence in law breaking," "of at least average intelligence," who
was not "a stranger to police techniques," "nor unaware of his
rights on arrest."'5 Haynes did not look like the vulnerable
defendant: he was neither young, nor mentally deficient and he
did not appear impressionable. Clark's opinion seizes the visu-
al terrain and sketches out caricatures of the criminal defen-
dants from the Warren Court:
[The petitioner] cannot be placed in the category of those types of
people with whom the Court's cases in this area have ordinarily
dealt, such as the mentally subnormal accused, Fikes v. Alabama,
352 U.S. 191 (1957); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), and
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); the youthful offender, such as
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), and Gallegos v. Colorado, 370
U.S. 49 (1962); or the naive and impressionable defendant, such as
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).'
The "mentally subnormal accused," the "youthful offender,"
and the "naive and impressionable defendant": these are the
images of criminal defendants from the Warren Court. Clark
turns cases into stereotyped mental images, and he then ap-
plies representativeness heuristics to solve the legal dispute:
Haynes does not look like any of these images of coerced crimi-
nal defendants, so he was not coercedY °0
-8 Id. at 522 (Clark, J., dissenting) (opinion joined by Justices Harlan, Stewart
and White).
Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
'o What is interesting about Clark's catalogue and, in particular, about his
description of Haynes, is the absence of the image of the savage and diabolical
defendant. The foil to the impressionable and naive defendant is not the rebel-
lious, but rather the mature adult who should be held accountable. Justice Clark
takes great pains in Haynes to describe for the reader his image of the defendant:
The petitioner is neither youthful in age (though his exact age is not
shown by the record) nor lacking in experience in law breaking....
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The use of this heuristic device, however, creates distance
in the debate. Goldberg and Clark begin to talk about two very
different individuals. Goldberg responds in two ways. First, he
sharpens his ideological position: regardless of the defendant's
mental state and physical ability, the police misconduct alone
renders the confession involuntary. Second, he projects his own
stereotyped mental image of the police officer. As the images
become more defined, the ideologies become sharper:
Official overzealousness of the type which vitiates the petitioner's
conviction below has only deleterious effects.... [I]t is the depriva-
tion of the protected rights themselves which is fundamental and
the most regrettable, not only because of the effect on the individual
defendant, but because of the effect on our system of law and justice.
Whether there is involved the brutal 'third degree," or the more
subtle, but no less offensive, methods here obtaining, official miscon-
duct cannot but breed disrespect for law, as well as for those
charged with its enforcement?'
Gradually, the majority and dissent are no longer able to
communicate, because Clark's stereotyped, available mental
image of the criminal defendant does not relate to Goldberg's
stereotyped, available mental image of the police.
The landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona 2 also re-
flects the centrifugal effect of images on adjudication. Warren's
Some indication of his approximate age is given by the facts that his
wife had been employed for some 14 years by the same employer, and
that 11 years prior to the trial he had his first brush with the law, i.e.,
drunken driving, resisting arrest and being without a driver's license.
Further, in 1949 he was convicted of breaking and entering, and in 1950
of robbery. During the same year he pleaded guilty to breaking jail and
to ftaking a car." He had not only served time but had been on parole
for two years, making regular visits to parole officers to whom he was
assigned.
Id. at 522 (Clark, J., dissenting). See also Massinh v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,
207 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (Mhe current incidence of serious violations of
the law represents not only an appalling waste of the potentially happy and useful
lives of those who engage in such conduct but also an overhanging, dangerous
threat to those unidentified and innocent people who will be the victims of crime
today and tomorrow") (emphasis added).
'Haynes, 373 U.S. at 519. This statement, which recalls Justice Brandeis's
classic statement in Olmstead v. United States, 277 US. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), is then repeated in the decisions of lower courts. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Smith v. New Jersey, 323 F.2d 146, 157 (3d Cir. 1963)
(en bane) (Biggs, C. J., dissenting); State v. Hinkle, 286 SX..2d 699, 700 (W. Va.
1982); State v. Hoyt, 124 N.W.2d 47, 59 (Wis. 1963).
32 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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opinion in Miranda is premised on voluminous, negative police
imagery. Ten full pages of his opinion document police
abuse."3 The lengthy descriptions of police interrogation, psy-
chological coercion, incommunicado detention and 'Mutt and
Jeff' tactics saturate the reader with graphic mental images of
police misconduct and victimization. "Only recently in Kings
County, New York, the police brutally beat, kicked and placed
lighted cigarette butts on the back of a potential witness under
interrogation for the purpose of securing a statement incrimi-
nating a third party."' A "police doctor told [the] accused,
who was strapped to a chair completely nude, that he proposed
to take hair and skin scrapings from anything that looked like
blood or sperm from various parts of his body." 5 Even
though these images have nothing to do with the facts in
Miranda, they compel the legal holding. Clark and White try
to rehabilitate the police. "I am proud of their efforts, which in
my view are not fairly characterized by the Court's opin-
ion." 6 'The obvious underpinning of the Court's decision is a
deep-seated distrust of all confessions."' 7 Because they are
images, however, these depictions of police officers are not sub-
ject to full rational debate. The images operate silently. They
offer facile heuristic devices that sharpen the competing ideolo-
gies and, ultimately, lead both sides further apart.
C. The Rehnquist Court
This dynamic relationship between imagery and ideology
is also expressed in the criminal law opinions of the Rehnquist
Court. Arizona v. Fulminante' is a good illustration. Oreste
Id. at 445.55.
=" Id. at 446.
" Id. at 446-47 n.7.
36 Id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting in part).
7 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 537 (White, J., dissenting).
w8 499 U.S. 279 (1991). The questions presented in Fulminante were whether
the confession was coerced, and, if so, whether harmless error applied to its intro.
duction at trial. Justice White, writing for a majority of the Court, declared that
the confession was coerced. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who disagreed, nevertheless
ruled, in the portion of his opinion that represented the opinion of the Court, that
harmless-error analysis applied to the introduction of a coerced confession. Justice
White, who disagreed with that, concluded for a majority of the Court that the
introduction of the coerced confession was not harmless and thereby affirmed the
opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court.
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Fulminante was convicted of the murder of his eleven-year-old
daughter in part on the basis of a confession that he gave to a
fellow inmate, Anthony Sarivola, who was a paid informant for
the F.B.I. Rehnquist's opinion projects an image of Oreste
Fulminante as a tough guy. He describes Fulminante as "an
experienced habitue of prisons." " "He had six prior felony
convictions and had been imprisoned on three prior occa-
sions." ° As Charles Ogletree suggests, "Chief Justice
Rehnquist regarded Fulminante as a sophisticated criminal...
who was able to handle the pressures to confess." 1
This stereotypical image of the tough guy leads Rehnquist
to conclude that Fulminante could protect himself The image
is absorbed in the heuristic move. Rehnquist concludes that
"Fulminante was an experienced habitue of prisons, and pre-
sumably able to fend for himself."' This question-whether
Fulminante felt like he could fend for himself-was the pivotal
issue, however. Rehnquist assumes the answer because he has
an image of a tough guy. Yet, the facts of Fulminante's incar-
ceration and of his physical and mental health support a com-
peting image. Justice White points out that "Fulminante was
slightly built and had spent time in the psychiatric unit of a
prison during an earlier period of incarceration due to his fear
of other inmates."' This competing image of the fearful de-
fendant, the defendant of slight build, carries with it a differ-
ent presumption-certainly not the presumption that he was
"able to fend for himself." Rehnquist does not see this other
image. In fact, he makes no mention in his opinion of
Fulminante's prior mental health problems or physical build.
The stereotyped, available mental image of the tough guy effec-
tively blinds Rehnquist.
Fulminante demonstrates how the mental image can re-
place reality, reinforce ideology, and, ultimately, break down
communication. Rehnquist and White are talking about two
different defendants. There is the tough guy Fulminante and
the fearful Fulminante-and the two never meet. The compet-
e" Id. at 306.
o Id. at 304.
' Ogletree, supra note 302, at 174.
212 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306 (emphasis added).
S3 Ogletree, supra note 302, at 174 (emphasis added) (citing Fulminante, 111 S.
Ct. at 1252 n.2).
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ing images sharpen their corresponding ideologies and create
an unbridgeable gap in the adjudicative process. The judges do
not discuss these images because images are not the locus of
rational debate. Yet they create strong centrifugal force in
adjudication.
Thompson v. Oklahoma 3 provides another powerful il-
lustration of this dynamic. The Thompson opinions, which
address the propriety of executing a fifteen-year-old, project
sharply different images of the criminal defendant. In what
can only be described as a classic Warren Court maneuver,
Justice Stevens portrays the young defendant as a child in
need of protection. He repeatedly characterizes him as "a 'child'
as a matter of Oklahoma law,"36 5 a "15-year-old child, " 66
"such a young person."3 67 In sharp contrast, Justice Scalia
draws the picture of a mature recidivist. Scalia sketches his
image based entirely on the hideous facts of the crime: "I begin
by restating the facts since I think that a fuller account of Wil-
liam Wayne Thompson's participation in the murder, and of
his certification to stand trial as an adult, is helpful in under-
standing the case."' Justice Scalia recites how "Thompson
brutally and with premeditation murdered his former brother-
in-law "' by beating him in the head with his boots, cutting
his throat and chest "so the fish could eat his body," shooting
him twice in the head, and throwing him in the Washita River
with a chain and blocks attached to his body.Y Justice Scalia
then narrates, in detail, the evidence at the juvenile transfer
hearing: Thompson had "an anti-social personality that could
not be modified by the juvenile justice system," and had prior
arrests for assault and battery, attempted burglary, and as-
sault with a deadly weapon. The image of the juvenile is
that of a recidivist, psycho-murderer.372
" 487 U.S. 815 (1988). Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality of the Court in
Thompson, concludes that the execution of a 15-year-old youth violates the Eighth
Amendment. Justice Scalia dissents, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice White.
'" Id. at 819.
3" Id. at 820.
'6 Id. at 823.
'" Id. at 859-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Thompson, 487 U.S. at 860.
'1 Id. at 861.
3'' Id. at 862.
"7 It is worth noting that the motive of the crime was not the most despicable.
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The contrasting images are not, by any means, acciden-
tal.'7 Scalia never uses the word child or children to describe
the defendant in his opinion-except when he quotes Stevens's
plurality opinion." Throughout his opinion, Scalia refers to
the defendant and the defendant's class as "15-year-old mur-
derer[s]," 37 "15-year-old criminals,"376 "15-year-old fel-
ons," 7  "15-year-olds," s5  "felons under 16,"7  "a person
under 16,s"' 'Juveniles under 1 6 ,"sm and 'juveniles." 2
Scalia deliberately rejects Stevens's image of the child and in-
stead portrays the class of fifteen-year-old defendants as
street-wise recidivists, writing that s "many juvenile delin-
quents [are] 'cynical, street-wise, repeat offenders, indistin-
guishable, except for their age, from their adult criminal coun-
terparts ... .'34 "[1In 1979 alone juveniles under the age of
It was not robbery, nor murder-for-hire, nor sexual gratification. Instead, the de-
fendant apparently killed the victim because the victim was severely abusing the
defendant's sister. Yet, even that does not get much play with Justice Scal, who
only writes that "the motive evidently being, at least in part, [the victim's] physi-
cal abuse of Thompson's sister." Id. at 860.
" As Richard Posner reveals in his study of Benjamin Cardzo's famous opin-
ion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), the omis-
sions and misstatements producing mental images may, at times, be deliberate.
See RicHARD A. PosNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 42-45 (1990); see also
L. H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE RHETORIC OF
AUTHORITY 8 (1995) (arguing that 'judicial opinions are filled with 'storied' that
purport to be Tactual' but that instead are 'fictional,' and furthermore, that these
ictions' could not be eliminated without crippling the legal enterprise").
"' Thompson, 487 U.S. at 872 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to Stevens' com-
ment about fiduciary obligations to children). Scalia also uses the term "child" once
when explaining the Oklahoma law. Id. at 861.
m6 Id. at 869.
37 Id. at 870, 873, 877.
'"Id. at 875.
37 Id. at 864, 866, 872, 874, 876, 877.
37 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 875.
Id. at 870.
"'Id. at 868.
Id. at 866, 868, 872.
Justice Scalia uses the same nomenclature--'16- and 17-year-old offend-
ers-in his majority decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 375, 377
(1989) (holding that execution of 16 and 17-year-olds is constitutional).
" Thompson, 487 U.S. at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Hearings on S.
829 before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 551 (1983)); see also, id. at 874 (as]oma of the
older minors become fully 'street-wise,' hardened criminals, doserving no greater
consideration than that properly accorded all persons suspected of crime") (quoting
Fare v. M fichael C., 442 U.S. 707, 734, n.4 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
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15, i.e., almost a year younger than Thompson, had committed
a total of 206 homicides nationwide, more than 1,000 forcible
rapes, 10,000 robberies, and 10,000 aggravated assaults."385
For Scalia, youth does not imply childishness, but rather the
early onset of recidivism: Stevens's image is flat wrong.
These images feed back upon and sharpen ideology.
"[Slociety [has] fiduciary obligations to its children," 6 writes
Stevens. "Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence
make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of
his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much
more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure
than is an adult." 7 The notion of fiduciary obligation is em-
powered, reinforced, shaped by the stereotyped available men-
tal image of the defendant as child. Stevens's argument crys-
tallizes around the concept of protecting the vulnerable child.
The image returns and reinforces the ideology.
This cycle of sharper images and crisper ideologies creates
more and more distance between competing ideologies. There
is no more common ground: Justice Stevens is dealing with a
child and with society's fiduciary obligation to protect its chil-
dren; Justice Scalia is dealing with street-wise repeat offenders
from whom society is obliged to protect itself. These are the
terms of the debate and they are irreconcilable. The parties are
essentially talking about different people--one a child, the
other an adult. Like the image of the fetus that drives pro-life
and pro-choice activists further and further apart, the image of
the child being executed creates distance in the adjudicative
process.
V. REFLECTIONS
What this Article suggests is that imagery is far more
determinative in the judicial process than is recognized in the
text of criminal law opinions. Images of criminal defendants
are powerful precisely because they are veiled-hidden not
Id. at 865-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 837.
38 Id. at 835.
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from the text or the reader, but from the decisionmaking pro-
cess itself. Images shape the criminal law and create centrifu-
gal force in adjudication.
A few other, equally intriguing generalizations can be
gleaned from the analysis. The first is that the images used injudicial opinions have become more visual with time. The word
descriptions in modem opinions are far more detailed, precise
and visual than those from the antebellum South. Second,
there seems to be greater predictability of outcome in the crim-
inal law cases from the modem period than in those from the
antebellum period. Third, images from the antebellum period
recur in modem cases. The image of the obedient and faithful
servant resurfaces in the Warren Court opinions. The image of
the threatening and savage slave is mirrored in the decisions
of the Rehnquist Court.
A. The Visualness of Modern Images
The images in the modem opinions are far more visual
than those of the antebellum period. The modem opinions
detail the defendant's age, height, clothes, IQ, race and crimi-
nal record. He is, for instance, a six-foot tall black male and
wears a black jacket with yellow letters spelling "Big Ben."'
Or, he is a twenty-five-year old, born in Messina, Italy, who
dropped out of school. 9 These details are extremely visual
and easily provoke stereotypical mental images of African-
American gang members or Italian mobsters.
In contrast, the opinions of the antebellum period provide
far less visual detail. In most cases, the slave is a stick figure,
like Flora390 or Bob.39' Lydia, the woman slave defendant in
Chief Justice Ruffin's famous opinion, State v. Mann, is such a
stick-figure that she loses her gender. Ruffin's entire discus-
sion about slaves in Mann assumes a male pronoun.' In the
' New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984).
' Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315, 316, 321-22 (1959).
= Flora, a slave v. The State, 4 Port. 111 (Ala. 1836).
33 Bob, a slave v. The State, 32 Ala. 560 (1858).
W2 Ruffin refers to the generic slave as 'he.' See The State v. Mann, 13
N.C.263, 266 (1829) ("he is thus to labour upon a principle of natural duty, or for
the sake of his own personal happiness, such services can only be expected from
one who has no will of his own").
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antebellum opinions, the slave defendant is, as slave, a symbol
of all slaves, a placeholder for general entreaties about the
character of slaves. Slaves as a class are "ignorant,"393 "useful
but degraded,"394 or at risk of becoming "the turbulent trai-
tor."395 These are not individualized descriptions of the par-
ticular slave defendant, and are far less visual than the mod-
em images."'
The ascendence of the visual reflects the fact that we live
today in a "visually oriented culture."397 Images of felons,
arrestees and criminal defendants-real and ficti-
tious-bombard us every day on television, newspapers and
magazine stands. The privileging of the visual is often de-
scribed as a peculiarly contemporary-or postmod-
ern-phenomenon.395 Our postmodern age is associated with
"the takeover of images." "99 It "borrows from popular culture,
from the world of advertising, movies, and TV."" It is associ-
ated with the music video, MTV, photo opportunities, CNN,
"' Bob, 32 Ala. at 567-68.
"' ALA. CONST. OF 1819, art. 6 in AIKIN'S DIGEST, supra note 102, Slaves § 16,
at 394.
39 The State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263, 267 (1829).
' Orlando Patterson has suggested that the bland stereotype image of the
slave is an ideological imperative of all systems of slavery and of the quintessen-
tial definition of the slave as a socially dead person. PATrERSON, supra note 111,
at 207. This may contribute to the less visual nature of the word descriptions.
" Petchesky, supra note 20, at 264. Petchesky observes how the use of the
visual has accelerated in recent decades. "Beginning with the 1984 presidential
campaign, the neoconservative Reagan administration and the Christian Right
accelerated their use of television and video imagery to capture political dis-
course-and power." Petchesky, supra note 20, at 264. See also Mary Becker, Con-
servative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L.
REV. 975, 1001 (1993) (discussing plight of "women in a consumer society dominat-
ed by visual images").
98 Postmodernism is, by its very nature, difficult to define. "Of all the terms
bandied about in both current cultural theory and contemporary writing on the
arts, postmodernism must be the most over- and under-defined." Linda Hutcheon,
Theorising the Postmodern Towards a Poetics, in THE POST-MODERN READER 76
(Charles Jencks ed., 1992). In its simplest usage, postmodernism is "the cultural
era in which we live" today. J. M. Balkin, What Is A Postmodern
Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1966, 1967 (1992). In its more complex mani-
festations, it is often "identified with the rise of mass forms of communication and
the comnmodification of intellectual products and symbolic forms." Id. at 1968.
"' Jennifer Wicke, Postmodern Identity and the Legal Subject, 62 U. COLO. L.
REV. 455, 456 (1991).
"0 Louise Harmon, Law, Art, and the Killing Jar, 79 IoWA L. REV. 367, 401
(1994).
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telecommunications, and mass culture."' Most of these phe-
nomena operate on the terrain of the visual: "With the televi-
sion image-the television being the ultimate and perfect ob-
ject for this new era--our own body and the whole surrounding
universe become a control screen." In this sense, our con-
temporary culture privileges the visual, which may account for
the shift in the judicial opinions."e
B. The Predictability of Modern Criminal Cases
There is also a difference regarding the predictability of
criminal law cases: remarkably, the outcome in modern cases
seems more predictable than in the slave cases, at least in a
state like Alabama. Voting patterns in criminal cases among
the current members of the Rehnquist Court are strikingly
consistent.4° In contrast, some southern appellate courts dis-
4l Balkin, supra note 398, at 1969-76.
"'Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication, in THE ANrI-AEsTHETIC:
ESSAYS ON POSTMODERN CULTURE 126-27 (Hal Foster ed., 1983).
"s The privileging of the visual, however, has also been described as a pecu-
liarly masculine phenomenon. "[M~eminist cultural theorists in France, Britain, and
the United States have argued that visualization and objectification as privileged
ways of knowing are specifically masculine (man the viewer, woman the spacta.
cle)." Petchesky, supra note 20, at 275. Luce Irigary, for instance, has written in
the context of sexuality, that
the predominance of the visual, and of the discrimination and individual-
ization of form, is particularly foreign to female eroticism. Woman takes
pleasure more from touching than from looking, and her entry into a
dominant scopic economy signifies, again, her consignment to passivity.
she is to be the beautiful object of contemplation.
Luce Idgary, This Sex Which Is Not One in THIS SEX WHICH Is NOT ONE 25-26
(Catherine Porter trans., 1985). Studies of the psychology of cex differences con-
clude that it is "fairly well established" that boys have greater visual-spatial abili-
ty than girls, but that girls have greater verbal ability than boys. ELEANOR E.
]MfACCOBY & CAROL N. JACKLIN, THE PS-CHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 351-52
(softbound ed. 1978), cited in Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 447, 481 n.128 (1984). Feminist writers, such as Evelyn Fox Keller and
Christine Rt Grontkowski, have chronicled the privilege of the visual "as the pri-
mary means to knowledge in Western scientific and philosophical traditions."
Petchesky, supra note 20, at 275 (citing Evelyn Fox Keller & Christine .
Grontkowski, The Mind's Eye, in DISCOVERING REALITY. FEINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
EPISTMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 207-24
(Sandra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983). Thus, from the perspective of
this critique, the supposed ascension of the visual in the late twentieth century
may be an optical illusion-or worse, a vehicle of gender domination.
" See Smith, supra note 313, at 193 (1992-93); cee also Hurley, supra note
313, at 988 n.232 (citing Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Introduction-The Rehnquist Court,
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played less consistency toward the slave defendant. 5 To be
sure, a large number of reversals during the antebellum period
bear little relationship to the criminal process, and are better
explained by the market function that slave trials performed.
Yet, even this explanation does not account fully for the cases
reversing convictions on defective indictments or speedy trial
violations-reversals that seem technical even by today's stan-
dards.
40 6
Several hypotheses could explain the increased predictabil-
ity. One is that slaveholders were more ambivalent about the
criminal process because of their financial investment in
slaves. Another is that the slavery debate unconsciously may
have expressed itself through the criminal law. What this
Article suggests, however, is that images play a role in the in-
creased predictability of modern cases. In contrast to the vul-
nerable defendant in the Warren Court or the cold-blooded
defendant in the Rehnquist Court, the slave defendant did not
have one consistent, fixed image. At times he revealed himself
obedient, at others he revealed himself a traitor. This multi-
plicity of imagery may well account for the lesser predictability
in outcome. Moreover, the increased visual nature of modem
opinions may invest courts with a greater need for consistency
in the outcome of litigation.
It might be argued that the difference in the range of
imagery is attributable to the way that this Article defines the
historical periods. The Warren Court opinions include only
those that Warren wrote or joined in; and the Rehnquist Court
opinions include only those that Rehnquist wrote or joined in.
Whereas these periods have narrow time frames and particu-
larly influential judicial personalities, the analysis of antebel-
22 U. TOL. L. REV. 521, 550 (1991)); Chemerinsky, supra note 312, at 57.
See statistics of reversals in slave cases discussed supra at note 277.
'D' See, e.g., The State v. Phil, a slave, 1 Stew. 81 (Ala. 1827) (discharging
prisoner convicted of assault with intent to rape white woman because of a viola-
tion of speedy trial statute); Nelson, a slave v. The State, 6 Ala. 394 (Ala. 1844)
(conviction for assault with intent to kill white person reversed for defective indict-
ment); The State v. Moses, a slave, Minor 393 (Ala. 1825) (conviction for murder
of master reversed because of defective indictment); The State v. Clarissa, a slave,
11 Ala. 57 (Ala. 1847) (conviction reversed for involuntary confession); Ned, a slave
v. The State, 7 Port. 187 (Ala. 1838) (prisoner convicted of murder discharged
because of improper discharge of jury); Wyatt, a slave v. The State, 25 Ala. 9
(Ala. 1854) (conviction reversed for involuntary confession).
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lum slave cases pans a much longer historical period and a
number of different courts and personalities. Does the wide-
angle approach blur the distinctions of the southern judiciary
and account for the more diverse imagery of slave defen-
dants-and the lower predictability of outcome?
Not really. In the first place, both extremes of slave imag-
ery can often be seen in one and the same judicial opinion. The
images bleed into each other as the slave's character changes.
A good illustration is Chief Justice Ruin's dissenting opinion
in State v. Caesar."' There, the slave defendant killed a
white man who had just battered the slave's friend. Ruffin
dissented from the court's ruling that the slave was guilty of
manslaughter rather than murder. Discussing the attributes of
slaves, Ruffin deliberately commingles his images. He writes:
[lit is an incontestable fact, that the great mass of slaves-nearly all
of them-are the least turbulent of all men; that, when sober, they
never attack a white man; and seldom, very seldom, exhibit any
temper or sense of provocation at even gross and violent injuries
from white men.... Such being the real state of things, it is a just
conclusion of reason, when a slave kills a white man for a battery
not likely to kill, maim, or do permanent injury... that the act did
not flow from generous and uncontrollable resentment, but from a
bad heart-one, intent upon the assertion of equality, social and
personal, with the white, and bent on moral mischief in support of
the assertion?'°
As Fisher explains, the slave defendant "had by his violent
reaction... lifted his mask, shown himself to be one of the few
inherently 'bad' slaves-rebellious, cunning, and homicid-
al." 9 Ruffin's use of both images in the same opinion reflects
a very different relationship to imagery. Whereas the Warren
and Rehnquist Courts each display their own unitary para-
07 31 N.C. 391, 9 fred. 49 (1849); see Fisher, supra note 22, at 1061-62.
" Caesar, 31 N.C. at 424 (emphasis added), quoted in Fisher, supra note 22, at
1061-62. It is interesting to note that the same image of the malignant heart is
projected in State v. Hoover, 4 Dev. & Bat. 365, 20 N.C. 413 (1839), a case in-
volving a white master accused of killing his slave. There too, Ruffin attributes
evil acts to a malignant heart. "TMhe acts imputed to this unhappy man do not
belong to a state of civilization. They are barbarities which could only be
prompted by a heart in which every humane feeling had long been atifled." Id. at
368; see also id. at 369 ("the acts of the prisoner were not perpetrated in sudden
heat of blood, but must have flowed from a settled and malignant pleasure in
inflicting pain, or a settled and malignant insensibility to human suffering").
" Fisher, supra note 22, at 1062.
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digm, the antebellum courts use both paradigms as alternative
portraits.
In the second place, the same antebellum judge can be
seen using different slave images in different decisions. Ruffin
is, again, a good example. In his opinion in State v. Mann,
410
Ruffin projects an image of the slave as traitor;41' yet, in
State v. Hoover,4 12 Ruffin portrays the slave as obedient ser-
vant.413 What is most revealing is that, in both cases, Ruffin
sets up the possibility that the image of the slave could have
been different, that the slave's character could well have been
its mirror opposite.
Ruffin's opinions are not eccentric deviations from other-
wise more consistent imagery. The opinions of Justice R. W.
Walker of the Alabama Supreme Court display the same vari-
ety of slave images. Walker described slaves as "ignorant"
14
in one opinion, yet acceded elsewhere to the image of the elev-
en-year-old slave as "heap[s] smarter than boys of twelve years
generally are."15 Similarly, Justice Ormond of the Alabama
Supreme Court portrayed the slave defendant as property in
one case, 6 recognized the moral obligations of slaves in an-
other, 4 1  and acceded to an image of the slave as loyal and
obedient servant in yet another case.418
410 13 N.C. 263 (1829).
41' The image of the slave that resists the master is that of "the turbulent
traitor." Mann, 13 N.C. at 267. Although we know nothing about Lydia, we know
that she became a traitor. She revealed herself, in the eyes of her hirer, to be the
rebellious slave.
4" 4 Dev. & Bat. 365 (N.C. 1839).
' The image of Mira, the slave in Hoover v. State, 4 Dev. & Bat. at 365, is
that of a faithful servant struggling to obey her master and mistress even though
she is "enfeebled" by brutal physical abuse. Ruffm primarily describes Mira-like
the Rehnquist Court-by means of a graphic depiction of her victimization. The
reporter of decisions supplements this with information that Mira was a faithful
servant who only failed to obey her master "from absolute inability to comply with
orders to which her condition and strength were unequal." Id. at 366 ("nor did it
appear that she was disobedient or impertinent to her master or mistress; on the
contrary, she seemed . . to do her best to obey the commands of her master,
and that when she failed to do so it was from absolute inability .... "). The im-
age that emerges from Hoover is that of a pregnant, enfeebled and obedient ser-
vant victimized by her master.
414 Bob, a slave v. The State, 32 Ala. 560, 567 (1858).
41" Godfrey, a slave v. The State, 31 Ala. 323, 325 (1858).
41' The State v. Marshall, a slave, 8 Ala. 302, 307 (1846) (discussed supra at
note 109).
41 Smith, a slave v. The State, 9 Ala. 990, 996 (1846).
41" The State v. Abram, a slave, 10 Ala. 928 (1847) (discussed at text accompa-
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The difference between the unitary, consistent imagery of
the Warren and Rehnquist Courts and the more varied, chame-
leon-like imagery of the antebellum period is not simply a
distortion created by a one-court analysis versus a multiple-
court analysis. It is, instead, inherent to the judicial attitude
toward slavery. And it may account, in part, for the astonish-
ingly lower predictability in the criminal law cases of the
southern antebellum period.
C. Recurring Images
Another intriguing, and disturbing, point of comparison is
the striking similarity between the image of the vulnerable
defendant in the Warren Court and the obedient slave from
the antebellum period, as well as the similarity between the
image of the cold-blooded defendant in the Rehnquist Court
and the rebellious slave in the antebellum period. 19 The shift
in imagery from the Warren to the Rehnquist Court resembles
the tale of the obedient and faithful servant that revealed
himself to be a Nat.
Although the historical nexus between antebellum and
modern imagery is veiled, the ideological continuity between
the antebellum and modem period can easily be documented.
The decision in McQuirter v. State4' is a case in point. Mr.
McQuirter,42" ' a black man, was accused of an attempt to com-
mit assault with intent to rape a white woman in the small
town of Atmore, Alabama.' The appellate court afrmed his
conviction, ruling that the jury, in determining McQuirter's
intent, could properly consider the "social customs" of the time:
"In determining the question of intention the jury may consid-
nying note 119 supra).
I' Sheri Lynn Johnson documents the modem "portrayals of persons of color as
animal-like or subhuman" in many contemporary criminal cases. See Johnson,
supra note 19, at 1753. Johnson references, for instance, the testimony of Officer
Koon at the Rodney King trial, wherein he testified that ing showed 'Hulk-like
strength,' 'gave out a bear-like yell,' and 'groaned like a wounded animal'" John-
son, supra note 19, at 1753.
420 63 So.2d 388, 390 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953).
,21 The defendant's first name does not appear from the appellate decision and
he is simply described as "a Negro man." Id. at 388.
4' The appellate court also failed to reveal the alleged victim's first name,
referring to her as "Mrs. Ted Allen." Id. at 389.
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er social conditions and customs founded upon racial differ-
ences, such as that the prosecutrix was a white woman and
defendant was a Negro man."' Not surprisingly, the evi-
dence at trial corroborated the prevailing customs. Although
McQuirter denied having made any statement, a policeman
testified at trial that McQuirter told him, upon arrest, that "he
came to Atmore with the intention of getting him a white wom-
an that night."
4
Two facts about the McQuirter case are striking. First, the
decision in McQuirter dates from the second half of this centu-
ry. The opinion was released on February 17, 1953. Second,
the legal holding in McQuirter traces its genealogy directly to
slave law. The opinion cites Kelley v. State,4" which in turn
cites "Lewis v. State."426 The full caption of Lewis v. State is
Lewis, a slave v. The State and the Alabama Supreme Court
held there that, where a slave is charged with attempted rape
of a white woman, "the jury should be instructed to give due
consideration to the manner of the slave.... ."
The disturbing similarities between images of criminal
defendants during the antebellum and modern periods, and
cases like McQuirter, poignantly suggest that the opinions
from the southern antebellum period are still relevant to a
study of criminal law today. They shed some light on the direc-
tion that imagery has taken in the second half of the twentieth
century.
CONCLUSION
The central implication of this Article is that self-criticism
and self-consciousness of our mental images of criminal defen-
dants and police officers may facilitate the adjudicative process
in the criminal law. I am not suggesting that critical reflection
43 Id. at 390.
4" Id. at 389.
" 56 So. 15, 15-16 (Ala. App. 1911) ("Taking into consideration the racial dif-
ferences existing between the prosecutrix and the defendant, and the differences in
their social life and customs ...we cannot say, as a matter of law, that there
was not some evidence in the case from which the jury might legally have drawn
the conclusion that the defendant, when he assaulted the prosecutrix, did so with
the purpose to ravish her.").
,3' Id. at 16 (citing Lewis v. State, 35 Ala. 380 (1860)).
' Lewis, 35 Ala. at 389.
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about mental imagery will necessarily produce consensus. It
will, however, encourage more genuine communication, a more
honest appreciation of the disagreement, and the possibility of
more informed decisions in the criminal law.
The alternative is to reify the competing images. This has
been proposed in both the abortion and the death penalty con-
texts. In the abortion debate, Rosalind Petchesky suggests that
pro-choice activists should recontextualize the image of the
fetus to regain the visual terrain: "[We have to restore women
to a central place in the pregnancy scene. To do this, we must
create new images that recontextualize the fetus, that place it
back into the uterus, and the uterus back into the woman's
body, and her body back into its social space.' Her propos-
al, then, is to correct the perceived distortion of the photo-
graph, reframe the image, and recontextualize the visual-by
means of competing images.
Robin West offers similar advice to the liberal members of
the Rehnquist Court in the death penalty context.4 West
demonstrates how the conservative members of the court have
taken control of the narrative terrain. West notes that "in
virtually every death case decided [in the 1989] Term, the
conservative majority opinion begins in the narrative voice, re-
counting the story of the victim's death." In contrast, West
observes "the complete absence of narrative and the narrative
voice in the dissenting opinions of the Court's remaining liber-
als." West concludes, on a pragmatic note, that "by eschew-
ing both the narrative voice and themes of responsibility, the
liberals neglect an opportunity to construct an alternative un-
derstanding of societal responsibility for criminality that might
challenge the unbridled individualism of the narrative account
provided by the conservative majority." West's proposal,
like Petchesky's, is to counter the narrative with a competing
I Petchesky, supra note 20, at 287; see also Petchesky, supra note 20, at 286
("[o]ne way out of this danger is to image the pregnant woman, not as an abstrac-
tion, but within her total framework of relationships, economic and health needs,
and desires").
See West, supra note 201, at 175.
West, supra note 201, at 169.
West, supra note 201, at 172. West notes an inverse relationship with re-
gard to rights-talk: the liberal members use the voice of rights, whereas the con-
servatives eschew that discourse. See West, supra note 201, at 173-75.
"' West, supra note 201, at 175.
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narrative rich with responsibility, as well as ethical and social
commitment.
To be sure, advocates may benefit by projecting compelling
images and narratives into the adjudicative process. An appel-
late brief must, in order to persuade, trigger a vivid image. Yet
the compelling image may not be enough. An attorney can
present a forceful image, but it may do little to persuade a
hostile reader. A capital defendant's attorney may offer a pow-
erful image and a rich narrative, but the appellate court can
easily ignore them and rely on the trial record or the trial
court's findings to recast the defendant and the narrative in a
less favorable light.
What I suggest, instead, is that the judge, the
decisionmaker, and the citizen, unveil their mental images. We
need to borrow insights from experimental sciences and crit-
ically examine how our mental images are triggered, how our
mental images differ from the word descriptions in the trial
record, how our mental images resemble a stereotype, how the
available mental images interfere with our reasoning process-
es, and how our mental images break down communication in
the adjudicative process. We need to discuss the role that the
image plays in the decisionmaking process. In order to resume
healthy communication, we need to expose the unbridgeable
gap created by imagery. Only then will there be actual dis-
course and a possibility-if nothing more-of reaching a more
informed decision.
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